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ABSTRACT
Drug-related problems produce dynamics across people and space that transcend the
physical boundaries of public housing developments. To develop successful drug-
fighting strategies in and around public housing, therefore, it is important to understand
the relationship of the development and its residents to the space and people in the
surrounding neighborhood. The dynamics amongfour criticalfactors determine whether
drug activity will motivate or alienate the capacity of the development and neighborhood
to organize effectively against drugs. These factors are (1) the dynamics of the drug
market, (2) the involvement and institutional capacity of land users in the neighborhood,
(3) the involvement and organizational capacity of public housing tenants, and (4) the
effectiveness of police forces operating in the area.
I explore the dynamics among these four variables in three public housing developments
and their surrounding neighborhoods in Boston, MA. The South Street case study
demonstrates how strengths in three of these factors -- a small drug market, active and
competent surrounding land users, and effective police -- can compensate for a largely
uninvolved tenant population and control drug-related problems. The second case study,
Charlestown, illustrates how severe weaknesses in all four variables create negative
dynamics that will be difficult to untangle. A large and tightly-organized monopolistic
drug organization that produces little random violence, withdrawn surrounding
neighborhood residents, and frightened tenants mean that police efforts are of little use in
the fight against drugs. The third case study, Bromley Heath. shows how strong
organizational capacity to address formidable drug problems exists within the
development and neighborhood, but barriers between the two places weaken the overall
impact of drug-fighting efforts.
In the final chapter, I suggest what the Boston Housing Authority would have to do
organizationally to employ at the development level the framework suggested herein. I
conclude by examining the strategic interventions that the four-point framework implies
for South Street, Charlestown, Bromley Heath, and their surrounding neighborhoods.
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INTRODUCTION
The dilemma over what to do about drugs and crime in public housing has
puzzled policy makers over the last thirty years. The long-term, big picture answer to this
dilemma certainly centers on generating well-paying jobs, reforming public schools,
mending broken households, and addressing drug addiction, to mention a few pieces of
the puzzle. Those explanations, however, offer little guidance, however, to people
struggling with this issue on a day to day basis at the neighborhood level. Local
strategies, on the other hand, have focused almost exclusively within the boundaries of
the public housing development. Little has been done to articulate a vision between these
two extremes -- a strategy that considers the people, institutions, and space in the
development and surrounding neighborhood.
A place I stumbled upon during the daily tasks of my work/study job at the Boston
Housing Authority (BHA) illuminated drug-fighting approach that appeared to cut across
development/neighborhood lines and bridge the gap between the conventional strategic
extremes. This place is the South Street development in Jamaica Plain. What surprised
me about South Street was that neighborhood residents were heavily involved in working
with tenants of the development to address drugs and related problems. Lots has been
written on how poverty and attendant problems have isolated public housing from its
surroundings. (Abt, Boston Housing Authority, National Commission of Severely
Distressed Public Housing, etc.) I had assumed that drug problems had driven deeper the
wedge between the South Street development and the surrounding neighborhood,
particularly because sharp socioeconomic and racial differences exist. This appeared to
be an instance where concern about drug problems had broken some of the development's
isolation and untied two communities that previously were quite separate.
I had heard before that drugs and crime could bridge sharp racial and class
differences, but I remained skeptical about whether this theory was grounded in reality. It
seemed too abstract an idea and smacked of something developed in a classroom seminar.
South Street offered the opportunity to examine how such a theory played out at the street
level under what seemed to be optimal circumstances.
Something else interested me in the South Street. Things seemed to be working
there. I wanted to look at successful drug-fighting strategies between development and
neighborhood to find out why and how this had occurred. All too often, evaluations focus
on failures and let partial successes go unnoticed. I wanted to see what caused
developments and neighborhoods succeed or fail in the fight against drugs. The question,
then, that I seek to explore in this thesis is:
What is important to understand about the dynamic relationship between public
housing and its surrounding neighborhood if one wants to effectively address
drugs and related problems?
METHODOLOGY
To explore this question, I look at how three public housing developments and
their surrounding neighborhoods have faired in their efforts to combat drugs and related
problems. In my search for examples of success, I asked knowledgeable BHA employees
whether they knew of specific developments and neighborhoods that were implementing
coordinated and effective strategies to address drugs. These BHA employees paused at
this question and had difficulty answering it. Part of this hesitation arose because they
thought about drugs predominantly within the confines of the development, and another
part resulted because few public housing developments and surrounding neighborhoods
in Boston appear to work effectively together in the fight against drugs.
I selected my case studies based on two criteria. First, I heeded BHA employee
opinions about which developments were implementing effective
development/neighborhood based strategies against drugs. As the cases that follow shall
demonstrate, some of these choices were good and others were bad. All three cases,
however, shed important light on the kinds of factors and dynamics that determine
whether a development and larger neighborhood can cope effectively with drug problems.
My second criterion for selecting developments was based on how many contacts I could
make in the development and neighborhood from my BHA connections. On the basis of
these two criteria I chose to examine the South Street, Charlestown, and Bromley Heath
developments.
My selection criterion raise concerns from a traditional research perspective.
Conventional wisdom advocates selecting cases so as to narrow the range of variables one
seeks to compare. Each of these three developments and neighborhoods are extremely
different in many ways. I would argue that the complexity of reality and the number of
factors that contribute to the drug situation in each development and neighborhood make
it next to impossible to find "comparable" developments.
Another problem with the conventional comparative approach is that it assumes
that humans behave according to social science categorizations. Take the socioeconomic
variable. Although middle-class residents live in the neighborhoods around South Street
and Charlestown, this socioeconomic categorization does not say much about what kinds
of people they are, whether they are involved in their community, or whether they know
how to exercise political clout. Middle-class people in Charlestown have a quite different
set of interests than middle-class people in Jamaica Plain. I jettisoned the idea of a
carefully controlled comparison and selected developments that offered me the greatest
promise for seeing the issues from the perspectives of different players in these
neighborhoods and uncovering the dynamic that exists on the street level.
Another methodological issue that I struggled with was how to define the
boundaries of surrounding neighborhoods. I have tried to define the boundaries based on
residents' perceptions of how the neighborhood should be defined with regard to crime.
In all three cases, then, the surrounding neighborhood is not defined solely in terms of
physical boundaries such as main roads or particular topographies, but rather by people's
perception of how far drugs and related problems extend.
I based my research almost exclusively on interviews with neighborhood
residents, members of neighborhood organizations, development tenants, police officers,
and city officials. In all I conducted 49 interviews. I also went on "ride-alongs" of all
three developments with police officers in the evenings. I supplemented my knowledge
of these neighborhoods and developments with local newspaper reports and literature on
the various initiatives in each place.
ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
In order to examine the question posed, I have organized the body of the thesis
into four sections. In Chapter One, I describe briefly history and theory of public
housing/neighborhood relationships, as well as how government interventions to address
drugs in public housing have evolved over the past twenty years. Chapters Two, Three,
and Four are the case studies of drug-fighting efforts in each of these three developments
and neighborhoods. In Chapter Two, I tell the story of how external pressure from
neighborhood activists has contained the drug problem in and around the South Street
development in the face of a weak public housing tenant organization. Chapter Three
tells the story in Charlestown of how negative dynamics both within and between the
Bunker Hill development and surrounding neighborhood has exacerbated drug problems
in and around the development. In Chapter Four, the Bromley Heath case demonstrates
the possibilities and limitations of strong internal and external organizing energy when
communication and cooperation across development/neighborhood lines are not fluid.
Chapter Five synthesizes the four major factors that emerge in the three case
studies as critical to understanding and addressing drugs problems and examines how
these factors interact to produce distinct dynamics in each neighborhood. The four
factors are:
(1) the dynamics of the drug market;
(2) the involvement and institutional capacity of land users in the surrounding
neighborhood;
(3) the involvement and organizational capacity of public housing tenants; and
(4) the effectiveness of police forces in the area.
These four factors and the dynamics they produce in each case serve as a framework for
understanding drug problems in almost all neighborhoods with public housing. In
Chapter Six, I use this framework to set forth options for strategic interventions in each
neighborhood and discuss how the BHA as an institution should assess its role within this
larger framework.
CHAPTER 1: HISTORICAL CONTEXT
INTRODUCTION
Drugs and crime produce dynamics across people and space that transcend the
physical boundaries of public housing developments. To develop successful strategies
that address drugs and related problems in and around public housing, it is important to
understand the relationship of the public housing development to the space and people in
the surrounding neighborhood. Then it is critical to see what factors and dynamics
determine whether drugs will promote or reduce the capacity of the development and
neighborhood to organize effectively against drugs.
Two contexts are important to pursue this agenda. First, a historical and
theoretical context is necessary to understand the relationship between the development
and surrounding neighborhood. On this backdrop, I shall layer the question of how drug-
related problems affect the development/neighborhood relationship -- do these problems
fragment or draw together the two communities? Second, it is important to understand
what the government has tried to do about drugs in public housing, and more specifically
how government interventions have treated the development/neighborhood relationship to
drugs.
HISTORY AND THEORY OF DEVELOPMENT/NEIGHBORHOOD
RELATIONSHIPS
From the start, the history of public housing and its surrounding neighborhood has
been a story of division. Although the development/neighborhood relationship has
changed dramatically, it has always been characterized by separation. The people in the
development and neighborhood have differed racially and in class terms. The
development and neighborhood have been differentiated sharply in physical terms.
Moreover, the development and surrounding neighborhood often have had profoundly
adverse impacts on one another during different time periods. This history of separation
and tension between development and neighborhood is crucial to understand, because it
has contributed powerfully to the disjointed and narrow way that strategies have been
devised to address drugs in and around public housing. The following look at public
housing history examines the transformation of these tensions.
In the beginning, public housing was better than the surrounding neighborhood.
In 1934, the Housing Division of the Public Works Administration was organized to
alleviate some of the pernicious effects that the Great Depression was exacting on the
vast American middle class. These efforts were focused on upgrading parts of the
swelling stock of slum housing in cities and providing jobs for the unemployed. In 1937
Congress passed legislation that established the United States Housing Authority and
required one for one replacement of slum housing with public housing. This legislation
sought to improve rather than increase the affordable housing stock, stabilize distressed
neighborhoods, and provide temporary shelter for the submerged middle class until it
reemerged on its feet.
The theory behind the policies of urban planners and redevelopers was that
erecting new public housing developments in distressed neighborhoods would improve
the conditions of the surrounding neighborhood. (Dee, p. 4) The "Annual Report of the
United States Housing Authority" of 1941 stated:
The ultimate objective of public housing has been to produce better communities
as well as better citizens by getting rid of slums and substituting wholesome living
conditions for that third of the Nation that has been ill-housed.(cited in Dee, pg. 6)
Researchers at the time were scrutinizing the hypothesis that the location of public
housing developments in distressed neighborhoods would improve the social and
economic characteristics of the surrounding neighborhood. William Dee's dissertation on
the subject concludes that "some real social changes of a reorganizing nature have been
fostered by the presence of the Jane Addams houses in the Near West Side of Chicago."
(Dee, p. 162) Of the variables examined, juvenile delinquency rates and residential
mobility rates decreased, and the percent of citizens who registered as voters increased in
the neighborhood with the public housing development, while these trends did not occur
in control neighborhoods without public housing. (Dee)'
Residents of surrounding neighborhoods initially received the projects with
ambivalence. On the one hand, residents of poor- to moderate- income neighborhoods
looked upon public housing developments with admiration. On the other hand, slum
clearance produced visceral hostility among some displaced residents and neighbors who
felt that the government had bulldozed livable communities. The Bunker Hill
development in Charlestown, which will be the subject of the second case study, is an
example of the bad blood that slum clearance produced between the development and
neighborhood. (Lucas)
Immediately after World War II, public housing became less controversial as it
came to serve returning veterans. Politicians supported veterans' housing because they
saw it as a way to stabilize moderate-income neighborhoods and gain votes by clustering
high densities of voters.
Beginnings of Turmoil
Three trends began to change fundamentally the population that public housing
began to serve and precipitated the view of public housing as a threat to the
neighborhood. These three trends were the Housing Act of 1949, the large migration of
blacks from the south to northeastern and midwestern cities, and the middle-class exodus
to the suburbs facilitated by post-war middle-class wealth and government mortgage
policies. The combination of these three trends meant that much of public housing in
northeastern and midwestern cities started to serve a poorer minority population.
The Housing Act of 1949 introduced a fundamental change in public housing
policy that shifted the way many neighborhoods, particularly white, middle-class
neighborhoods, regarded public housing. (Meyerson, Martin, and Banfield; 1955)
Whereas the 1937 Housing Act was intended merely to replace substandard housing, the
This dissertation tests the hypothesis through a before and after experiment of the effects that the first
public housing development in Chicago had on its surrounding neighborhood. The periods of examination
are from 1935 through 1937, the period before the development was occupied, and from 1938 through
1940. the period after the development was opened.
Housing Act of 1949 provided federal funds for new development of public housing on
vacant and other lands. This change presented many moderate- and middle-income
neighborhoods with the prospect of having public housing developments located in their
back yard.
In the early 1950s, neighborhood associations, particularly those in moderate- to
middle-class neighborhoods, opposed the siting of public housing nearby for three main
reasons. (Meyerson)2 The first reason was racial; residents of these neighborhoods
feared that public housing inevitably would bring blacks into the neighborhood. The
legislation coincided with a large migration of blacks from the south to midwestern and
northeastern cities. The second reason related to class. The 1949 Housing Act restricted
public housing to low-income people by mandating that the highest rents be 20 percent
lower than the lowest prevailing market rents and by authorizing eviction of above-
income families. (Bratt, p. 341) One neighborhood council leader in Chicago articulated
his view of the new lower-income public housing population:
You know, a lot of people say it's the colored we don't want, but the kind of
whites who live in public housing are just as bad. It's not the colored alone. It's
the whole class of people who live like that." (Meyerson, p. 110)
The third reason residents in these neighborhoods opposed public housing was concern
that new black arrivals to the neighborhood would decrease property values.
The 1960s and Urban Renewal
Urban renewal pushed public housing further toward its future role as the scourge
of the neighborhood. Urban renewal exacerbated the concentration of poor people in
public housing by depositing people displaced by the program to the top of the waiting
list for public housing. This population urban renewal displaced often consisted of poorer
households, which meant:
a relaxation of the tenant screening processes and a reduction of average income.
Since rent was a fraction of residents' income, and income was declining, project
maintenance also became an increasing problem, especially because of the
absence of separate government operating subsidies. Slowly, public housing
2 All of these reasons are based on Meyerson and Banfield's Politics, Planning, and the Public Interest,
Chapter 4, "The Climate of Neighborhood Opinion."
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became seen not as a temporary haven for the incipient middle class, but as a
domicile of last resort. (Vale, p.5)
By the end of the 1960s, the project had become worse than the neighborhood in many
cases.
1970 -1990; Further Isolation of Public Housing from Neighborhood
A number of trends in the 1970s further isolated public housing developments
from their neighborhoods. The 1993 Final Report of the Public Housing Drug
Elimination Program (PHDEP) stated: "often physically isolated from the beginning, the
social isolation of many public housing developments has increased, in many cases
dramatically, over the last two decades. (Abt Associates, p. 74)" Deindustrialization of
urban areas, particularly in the midwest and northeast, and movement of businesses and
working- and middle-class families to the suburbs isolated public housing residents from
jobs. (ibid.) As the population of public housing became poorer, the percentage of
welfare households and families headed by single females grew, and the population
became more isolated socially and economically, drugs, crime, and other social problems
soon followed.
Residential and commercial abandonment of central city areas surrounding public
housing developments "left a vacuum which the illegal drug trade has exploited." (ibid.) 3
Because public housing received lower police coverage than other areas of their cities and
because developments had such an anonymous design, the projects often became a place
where people could deal drugs and conduct other illicit behavior with impunity. One
public housing police officer summed the situation up nicely:
I'll tell you, if I was a drug dealer, I'd go set up my shop in the projects. It's the
safest place in the whole city to deal drugs.4
These dynamics weakened community control systems in the development and set off a
vicious cycle in which drugs and crime further incapacitate public housing communities
to resist. Consequently drug dealing roots itself more strongly into the development,
which further isolates it from the outside.
3 ibid.
4 McKenna, Kevin. Personal interview. 29 February, 1996.
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During the 1970s and 1980s, federally mandated integration of the projects drove
another wedge between project and neighborhood. Integration generated acute
project/neighborhood tensions in areas that had previously resisted racial mixing and had
maintained racial homogeneity. Federally mandated integration of the projects often
generated white flight from developments and surrounding neighborhoods. As a result of
these trends, the central city projects became inhabited predominantly by poor minorities.
A flurry of theories arose to reverse the self-reinforcing trends of drugs, crime,
and isolation. During the 1960s and 1970s most of these hypotheses revolved around
physical design issues. In the 1960s, theorists hypothesized that "physical integration" of
the development into the neighborhood would foster social and economic integration of
public housing residents into the larger community. (Kreisberg)
Louis Kreisberg considered the effect of the design, siting, and socioeconomic
characteristics of four public housing developments on their surrounding neighborhoods
and concluded that "socioeconomic differences are not a particularly important barrier to
social interaction between project tenants and neighborhood residents." (ibid.) Most
social interaction occurred when developments were spatially integrated into their
surrounding area -- when buildings faced outward and there was a high degree of
continuity and interconnectedness between neighborhood and development streets and
walkways. (ibid.) Conversely, physical barriers were the most important cause of a
development's isolation from its neighborhood. The development Kreisberg found most
isolated faced inward, was fronted only on one side by houses, and housed a small
percentage of its tenants on street level.(ibid.)
Early 1970s' theories about how to address increasing crime in public housing
continued to focus on physical design, but represented a radical departure from the
integrative approach of the 1960s. Oscar Newman's theory of defensible space and turf
reclamation advocated physical redesign to focus developments inward and erect physical
barriers against predators from outside. If anything, however, the defensible space theory
helped to further isolate the development residents from the surrounding neighborhood.
(Gardiner, p. 13)
The increasing concentration of poor minorities in public housing in the 1970s
also spawned a number of theories about how crime correlated with the socioeconomic
and racial mix of the public housing population. Oscar Newman led the charge on this
front as well. First, Newman advocated that an income mix is essential to safety. Middle
class values are the key to eradicating crime -- "the majority of inhabitants in such
communities who, although poor, are not criminals, are unable to enforce conventional
middle-class morals and attitudes."(Newman, 1975, p. 22)
Newman enumerated a number of reasons why middle-class flight increases
crime. First, a middle-income population is replaced by a low- to moderate-income
population. Second, such flight usually results in higher density occupancy. Third, there
is a lower tax base for municipal services, and fourth, such flight "removes a population
with a low tolerance for crime, a strong demand for police presence, and a support for
police activities that deter crime." (Newman, 1980, p.83) Anthony Downs describes a
threshold of middle-class families that a neighborhood needs in order to avert the
downward spiral of neighborhood deterioration -- "both the upgrading desired by low-
and moderate- income households and the protection of neighborhood quality desired by
middle-income can be achieved in the same neighborhoods if a significant number of
low- and moderate- income families live there and if middle-class dominance is
maintained." (cited in Newman, 1980, p. 45)
The general transformation of public housing from the ray of hope in distressed
neighborhood to a weight that drags down the surrounding neighborhood has been fraught
with tension and division. Throughout this history, the development and the
neighborhood for the most part have been looked at separately. This division has
reverberated in the types of interventions that the government has proposed to address
drugs and crime in and around public housing.
HISTORY OF INTERVENTIONS
During the last 20 years, the federal government has employed a myriad of
interventions to address drugs and crime in public housing. The history of interventions
is not primarily about how drugs and related problems affect the development and
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surrounding neighborhood, rather it has focused narrowly on what to do about crime in
public housing. Concern over the relevance of development/neighborhood relations to
drugs has surfaced in bits and pieces of comprehensive plans to fight drugs in public
housing, but has flickered and died out quickly.
Anti-crime interventions of the early 1970s focused narrowly on the site
boundaries of the public housing development and sought to wall off the development
from the surrounding neighborhood. These strategies were premised on Oscar Newman's
theories that public housing developments needed physical protection from outside
criminals. Newman advocated redesigning buildings to increase physical barriers to
intruders from the outside. Newman hypothesized that reducing the size of development
clusters and reconfiguring the design of the development inward would evoke the latent
territoriality in development residents and allow them to better monitor criminal activity.
Ultimately, such design changes would frighten off criminals by conveying to them the
sense that "if they enter, they are very likely to be observed, to be identified as intruders,
and to have difficulty escaping." (Newman, 1980, p.83)
By the late 1970s there was little faith that Newman's physical redesign theories
coupled with hardware approaches could effectively address crime in the development. A
number of major criticisms were leveled at defensible space interventions. First,
defensible space focused the development in on itself and ignored the more complicated
dynamic between the development and surrounding neighborhood. Second, the
defensible space approach was ill-equipped to deal with developments where crime was
generated from within, particularly when criminals resided in buildings. Third,
interventions based on this theory walled off developments from their surrounding
neighborhoods, creating a "fortress within a neighborhood, further stigmatizing the public
housing project rather than making it part of the neighborhood." (Gardiner, p.14)
Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration (UIACI), 1978
The waning faith in hardware approaches moved HUD to consider a more
comprehensive approach to crime in public housing in its Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime
Program. The program sought to address in a holistic way the social, economic, and
physical problems of crime in public housing. The comprehensive strategy incorporated
one of the first real efforts to understand the relevance of development/neighborhood
relationships to crime issues:
One theme that emerged again and again ...was the need to understand how much
and what kind of crime is committed by whom within the projects versus
surrounding residential neighborhoods. Where do crimes occur? What are the
crime-specific mobility patterns? To what extent does project crime involve
invasions from outside and what program strategies does this imply? To what
extent are project crimes "inside jobs" and what program strategies are implied?
If our interventions reduce some kinds of crime in projects, will the result be that
such acts merely are displaced to the surrounding neighborhood? At present,
there are few answers to such questions. Yet such answers and their variations
among different kinds of crime are critical for implementing practical programs
which have a chance of succeeding. (HUD, 1980, p. 67)
Despite expert exhortation to understand development/neighborhood relationships with
regard to crime, these issues never made it to the forefront of HUD's agenda, and the
important questions set forth above went unanswered. I shall, however, briefly lay out the
extent to which HUD dealt with the development/neighborhood issue in the UIACI.
To develop a comprehensive approach to crime both inside and outside of the
development, HUD designated as one of its UIACI program areas "Establishing Stronger
Linkages with Programs from Local Government and Other Sources Which Co-Target on
the Project and the Surrounding Neighborhoods -- Residential, Recreational, Commercial
and Industrial." (ibid.) To accomplish this, experts advised that:
resident groups in public housing should solicit the support and aid of other
community, public, and private non-profit organizations. Public housing is often
socially isolated form the rest of the city with its residents cut off from others.
Overcoming social isolation has the potential of expanding the resources available
to combat crime in and around public housing. (HUD, 1978, p. 104)
The UIACI guidebook was silent about how to link individuals and institutions in
the surrounding neighborhood with local government so as to leverage crime-fighting
resources in the development. Moreover, the guidebook did not mention the kinds of
activities and programs that could effectively link neighborhood institutions with tenant
organizations. The new components that the demonstration introduced were important
normative ideas; however, they remained static recommendations. No effort was made to
explore what the dynamic relationships would look like among development
organizations, neighborhood institutions, and local government in the fight against crime
in public housing. The guidebook simply stated what the final outcomes should be
without providing a map or framework of how to get there.
The Reagan Administration HUD promptly rubbed out the rudimentary
beginnings of a development/neighborhood strategy to address crime, and gave strongly
mixed signals about what the UIACI had accomplished to reduce crime in general in
public housing. With regard to the development/neighborhood component of the UIAIC,
the Final Report of the Evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration
found that working relationships between the development, neighborhood organizations,
and local government improved only in the rare instances when cooperative, mutually
supportive relations already existed. (HUD, 1985, p.73) Where relations between
development and outside agencies were hostile or nonexistent, efforts to establish
linkages failed. (ibid.) In short, the report dismissed as hopeless government
interventions to establish linkages with outside organizations; groups predisposed to
cooperate with one another would do so on their own, and funded initiatives could not
forge or repair frayed or non-existent relations between groups inside and outside of the
development.
Oasis Technique
In the otherwise barren public housing crime-fighting landscape of the Reagan
years, the one initiative to touch on the relation of the development and surrounding
neighborhood to crime was the Oasis Technique. It should be emphasized, however, that
Oasis was not a clear effort to join the public housing developments and surrounding
neighborhoods in crime-fighting efforts, but rather an effort to deal with a distressed
urban area whether it had public housing or not. Oasis targeted interventions on specific
areas of larger distressed neighborhoods, which was supposed to produce a ripple effect
throughout the entire neighborhood. (Keyes, 1992, p. 157) Some of these target areas
happened to be public housing developments, but the general program was not explicitly
aimed at addressing crime in public housing and surrounding neighborhoods.
Public Housing Drug Elimination Program (PHDEP) 1988-1996
With the advent of the crack epidemic in the mid-1980s, HUD framed what it had
had previously deemed crime prevention as combating drug use and related crime in
public housing. (ibid., p.32) The driving principle behind the PHDEP is the long-delayed
recognition that drug use and related crime were being generated more from within the
development than without, so that more than a defensible space approach was needed.
(ibid., p. 33) Once again, the comprehensive approach returned; however, this time to
address drug use and related problems rather than crime. In general, the program seeks to
strike a balance between the law enforcement/security and the preventative component of
drug elimination. As was true with the UIACI, the development/neighborhood and the
inside/outside linkages issues once again surface only as a subsidiary component of the
comprehensive strategy.
The PHDEP deals foremost with how to reduce drug use and related crime in
public housing. (Abt) The development/neighborhood part of the intervention is quite
secondary. In fact, the "neighborhood effects" component of the evaluation it is merely
used as one of the six criteria to evaluate the impact of the PHDEP. The evaluation
appears to include this criterion to guard against the accusation that development-focused
interventions such as the PHDEP serve only to displace crime into the surrounding
neighborhood. There is little effort to understand the impact of crime from the
surrounding neighborhood on the development other than the one example of the Weed
and Seed Program's displacing crime into a development in Pittsburgh. (ibid.) Moreover,
there is little if any mention of the effect that the dynamic of the
development/neighborhood relationship has on the shape that crime takes in the area and
the capacity of the development and neighborhood to deal with crime.
The PHDEP raises as a part of one of its six program areas the importance of
expanding the public housing agency linkages with other government and private
agencies. As was true of the UIACI, however, the evaluation fails to connect these local
government linkages to the neighborhood level. There is no examination of how the
political and institutional capacities of land users in the surrounding neighborhood link
development, government, and private agencies to address drugs and related crime in and
around the development. Moreover, the evaluation discusses the issue of linkages with
outside agencies mostly at the public housing authority level rather than the development
and neighborhood level. In short, the evaluation does not make explicit the role that the
neighborhood plays in establishing linkages with government and private agencies on
behalf of, or in concert with the development.
HUD's most recent efforts to consider the development and surrounding
neighborhood are embodied in the Urban Revitalization Demonstration Hope VI Plus
Grant (URD Plus). The URD Plus represents one of the first earnest attempts to plan
revitalization of the most distressed public housing in concert with rehabilitation of larger
core urban areas. URD Plus requirements intend to address the physical, social, and
economic isolation of public housing developments by forcing local housing authorities
to draw on the network of organizations around the development. (BHA, 1995, p. ES. 1.)
Site redevelopment and other collaborations involving public/private partnerships are the
mechanism proposed to link public housing developments into the institutional network
of the surrounding neighborhood and larger city. Since drug issues will play a substantial
role in determining whether such a strategic conception can work at the local level, the
chapters that follow will provide a framework for addressing drugs within the larger goal
of integrating developments into their surrounding neighborhoods.
CHAPTER II: SOUTH STREET
INTRODUCTION
A group of activist homeowners from the neighborhood surrounding the South
Street public housing development in Jamaica Plain have led successful community
efforts to combat relatively moderate drug problems in and around the development.5
The homeowners have played the predominant organizing role because, with the
exception of a few tenant leaders, the public housing tenants have been withdrawn.
Homeowners and a few tenants from the development have made gallant efforts to build
the organizing capacity of the development tenants, but these efforts have failed to
institutionalize a self-sustaining, politically potent tenant organization capable of getting
things done. To date, however, pressure that individuals from the neighborhood have
exerted on the city has been sufficient to effectively address drug problems without strong
support from development tenants.
CONTEXT AND PROBLEM
Before looking at the way that the development/neighborhood relationship has
affected drugs and related problems, and vice versa, I provide a general picture of
Jamaica Plain. Second, I examine the characteristics of the development surrounding the
neighborhood and give a brief history of the relationship between the places. Third, I shall
describe the drug market that has operated in and around the development.
1. The Development and Surrounding Neighborhood
Jamaica Plain -- the Larger Neighborhood Context
During most of the twentieth century, Jamaica Plain has been home to a
predominantly working-class white population. Over the last 30 years, however, Jamaica
Plain has undergone dramatic demographic changes that have characterized many other
neighborhoods in Boston. Blacks and Hispanics replaced many of the middle-class
5 Unless otherwise specified, "the neighborhood" refers to the sub-neighborhood within Jamaica Plain that
surrounds the development.
whites who moved to the suburbs after World War II. As a result, Jamaica Plain has
become a place where acute racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic differences exist within
narrow boundaries. Unlike other parts of Boston where racial and ethnic transitions of
neighborhoods have been fraught with hostility and violence, however, communities in
Jamaica Plain have managed this transformation with far less confrontation and
animosity. Consequently, Jamaica Plain has developed a reputation as an ethnically
diverse and tolerant enclave in Boston.
Another important feature of Jamaica Plain is the dense network of neighborhood
institutions that historically have cooperated at critical moments rather than competed
with one another to sustain the neighborhood. (Feloney) This cooperative spirit has been
a crucial factor in preserving the neighborhood during times of change and transition.
(Feloney) Moreover, residents of Jamaica Plain also have a tradition of political activism.
Boundaries of Neighborhood Surrounding the Development
I have defined the neighborhood surrounding the development according to how
the residents have perceived the reach of drugs and related problems (see Map 1). The
neighborhood is bounded on the west by the Arborway and Centre Street and Sedgewick
Street to the North. The intersection of Centre Street and South Street is as far north as
the neighborhood runs. On the east, The T line bounds the neighborhood running from
Sedgewick Street down to the Forest Hills Station T-Stop. The Forest Hills station does
bring drug traffic into the South Street neighborhood.6
Demographic Characteristics -- the Development and Surrounding Neighborhood
There are considerable socioeconomic and racial differences between the
development and the surrounding neighborhood. Residents of the development are
considerably poorer than the residents of the surrounding neighborhood, and the
development has a higher percentage of minorities.
Incone Differences
Considerable income differences exist between residents of the South Street
development and the surrounding neighborhood. The average household income for the
development is $9,939 (1996 dollars) and the average household income for the
6 Hayes, Chris. Personal interview. 3 April, 1996.
surrounding neighborhood is $38,718 (see Map 2)7 Table 2.1 shows the large difference
in average household income between the development and neighborhood.
Table 2.1 Average Household Income of Development and Neighborhood
Project (1996) Tract 201.004 Neighborhood Boston
(contains project) (1996) (1996)
(1996)
Average $9,939 $37,928 $38,718 $32,682
Household
Income
[Source: Boston Housing Authority (BHA) MIS and 1990 Census, STF 3A]
Racial and Ethnic Differences
Over the past 20 years, the demographics of the development have changed
dramatically. Working-class whites have moved out of the development and lower-
income blacks and Hispanics have replaced them. Currently, the development is 22%
white and 78% minority. The surrounding community contains a much higher percentage
of white families, but Hispanics have moved into the neighborhood during the last five
years.8
Table 2.2 Racial and Ethnic Composition
Development Development Neighborhood Boston
(1990) (1996) (1990) (1990)
Whites 40% 22% 78.7% 59.4%
Minorities 60% 78% 21.3% 40.6%
Hispanics 23% 43% 9.0% 10.8%
Blacks 35% 32% 9.4% 24.3%
Asians 2% 4% 3.4% 5.2%
(Source: 1996 BHA MIS and 1990 Census)
Differences in Age Composition
The family composition of the development is quite different from that of the
surrounding neighborhood. The development is composed of many female-headed
households. Although the percentage of youths in the development is very high, the
absolute numbers of youth are relatively low compared with larger public housing
7 All income figures for the surrounding neighborhood in the thesis are 1990 incomes inflated by the
Consumer Price Index to 1996 prices.
8 Since the 1990 Census is that last source of racial and ethnic data at the block group level, it was not
possible to document the current racial and ethnic composition in the surrounding neighborhood.
24
developments. The small number of youth in the development means that drug dealing is
not as rampant as in places with larger concentrations. Moreover, small youth
populations usually are easier to control because officers can get to know all youth in the
area.
Table 2.3 Age Composition 9
Development (1996) Neighborhood (1990)
0-4 14.1% (46) 6.8%
5-13 22.3% (73) 7.1%
Under 20 51.1% (168) 17.9%
Housing Stock
The neighborhood around South Street is struggling to hold the line against forces
of physical deterioration, crime, and disinvestment. Much of its housing stock consists of
single-family homes and dilapidated triple-deckers. In 1990, the median value for a
single-family home in the South Street neighborhood is $55, 534 as opposed to $160,100
in Boston. The neighborhood has a group of homeowners who have lived in the
immediate neighborhood for a long time; however, in the last five years, seven or eight
homeowners have sold their homes and left the neighborhood. Homeowners who do
remain also feel the threat of decreasing property values that result from crime and
disinvestment. Such a threat makes retaining those middle-class homeowners both more
difficult and important.
Table 2.4 Housing Stock
South Street Neighborhood Boston (1990)
(1990)
Total Housing Units 2078 250,863
Percent of Vacant Units 4.7% 9.0%
Owner Occupied 31.1% 30.9%
Renter Occupied 68.9% 69.1%
Median Value of House $55,534 $160,100
Median Rent $567 $625
(Source: 1990 Census)
Numbers in parenthesis are absolute numbers.
Siting and Size of Development
The small size of the development and its siting in the midst of a dense residential
neighborhood have facilitated interaction between development and neighborhood
residents. The dynamics among the small size of the development, residential siting, and
activist homeowners produce fortuitous circumstances for drug-fighting efforts.
Size
At 132 units, the BHA's smallest family development, South Street does not alter
the overall character of the neighborhood. Although the lowest-income households in the
area live in the development, it is small enough that low-income households still compose
a relatively small percentage (6%) of the total South Street neighborhood population.
The smaller absolute number of poor people in the development means that the
magnitude of the social problems associated with poverty, such as crime is not as great as
in larger public housing developments.
Another way that the small size of the development has contributed to the success
of community public safety initiatives is captured by Oscar Newman's hypothesis that
"smallness is essential to identity." (Newman, 1980) Newman was referring to the
capacity of public housing residents to identify each other, but this concept applies for
residents of the surrounding neighborhood, as well. Residents from the neighborhood
emphasized the sense of security they derived from knowing the parents of youth from
the development. According one neighborhood resident:
Neighbors began trying to get to know kids and who their mothers were, so that if
a child were acting out or putting himself in danger, the neighbors knew who to
contact immediately. South Street's size was instrumental to allowing everyone
to recognize each other.' 0
Siting
South Street is sited in the middle of an extremely dense residential neighborhood
of triple deckers and is abutted by residences along most of its edges. The physical
proximity of the development to the neighborhood makes neighbors feel the impact of
"( Malia, Liz. Personal interview. 22 November, 1996.
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drug dealing and has created an imperative for the neighborhood residents to address
issues occurring in the development. According to Liz Malia:
Because the development is so close geographically to the immediate residential
neighborhood, the neighborhood really felt the impact of the drug trafficking.
Crime would spill out into the neighborhood. People heard gun shots at night.
Surrounding neighbors realized that they couldn't just remove themselves from
the problem.
There are a few physical barriers that separate the development from the
immediate neighborhood. First, no streets run through the development, which closes it
off from the neighborhood. Second, the topography in back of the development
constitutes both a barrier and a integrative mechanism. The houses sited on the incline
above the development look down upon the roofs of the project buildings. Ironically, the
topography appears to have brought drug dealing from the roofs of development buildings
within immediate visibility of houses that border the development along this incline.
This physical relationship created an incentive for residents of these neighborhood houses
to address drug-related issues.
Non-Residential Uses
A commercial strip along South Street abuts one side of the development. Most
of the stores along the strip are small owner-run stores -- convenience stores, a pizza
shop, hair salon, -- that service the local market. Hispanics have come to run increasingly
more of these businesses along South Street. There are no vacant store fronts along the
strip that runs near the development. Finally, because parking is scarce, there is a good
deal of foot traffic in the area.
Neighborhood Institutions
There are some institutions in the immediate neighborhood. St. Thomas Aquinas
Church and the Farnsworth Elderly Center abut the development to the north. These
institutions have not been heavily involved with initiatives involving the development.
The Agassiz School, located in the neighborhood has supported many neighborhood
activities, many of which have addressed youth issues and drugs.
" ibid.
2. History of Development/Surrounding Neighborhood Relations
Before the mid-1980s there was little interaction between residents of the
development and the South Street neighborhood.1 Historically, the only interaction
between residents of the development and neighborhood has centered around drug issues.
The crack epidemic of the late 1980s rekindle interaction, albeit tense, between residents
of the development and surrounding neighborhood.
Cooperative organizing efforts did not occur immediately. Initially, residents of
the surrounding neighborhood could ignore the drug dealing problem because most of the
dealing and associated crime occurred inside the development -- in the apartments and
hallways. Neighborhood activist Diane Quiroga characterized the initial neighborhood
response to the problem as an "us vs. them thing." 13 Moreover, neighborhood residents
still wanted to believe that the illicit behavior was occurring solely within the confines of
the development.' 4
As drug dealing and crime pushed beyond the boundaries of the development,
neighborhood residents realized that the neighborhood's survival was linked inextricably
to what happened in the development.1 5 Residents in the development, on the other hand,
began to recognize that they needed help from anyone they could find.'s This recognition
of interdependence has been a fundamental factor in breaking down class and racial
differences and leading the communities to work together to implement successful crime-
fighting strategies.
Successful crime fighting efforts have spawned broader attempts at community
building. What initially started from homeowner self-interest in preserving property
values and quality of life soon became a neighborhood crusade to pressure city officials to
improve the living conditions and quality of life of South Street residents.' 7 Activists
from the surrounding neighborhood also have made strong efforts to build the organizing
12 Quiroga, Diane. Personal interview. 3 November, 1996.
13 ibid.
14 ibid.
15 ibid.
6 McNary, Earlene. Personal interview. 1 November, 1995.
1 Quiroga.
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capacity of South Street residents, as well as increase their expectations for city
services.18 In almost all of these efforts, however, the activists have taken the initiative
and provided the energy for such efforts.
3. Drug Market and Crime in South Street and Surroundings
The Problem
Although the South Street neighborhood has faced all types of drug dealing
organizations, I shall focus on the neighborhood's success in addressing a small
monopolistic market in the development. In the early 1990s, the root of drug dealing in
the South Street neighborhood stemmed from one family in development.19 This family
attracted a host of dealers from outside the neighborhood to begin working from the
development.
Structure of the Drug Market
Two brothers from the development, the Menendez brothers, were primarily
responsible for increasing drug dealing and crime in the neighborhood. The brothers
would recruit youth from the development and neighborhood to deal drugs and keep
watch for police from the roofs of the development buildings. Most of the dealing took
place in the hallways and apartments of South Street buildings.
Buyers and Users
Most buyers appear to have come from outside the neighborhood. The Menendez
brothers used the development as a base from which to supply customers from all over
the city. South Street is an appealing location for drug dealing because it is located near
upper-middle income neighborhoods whose residents are good customers -- they pay and
generally do not create problems. Moreover, the location of the development set back in
a residential neighborhood bounded off by the Arborway and Centre Street helps seal off
the area from market competition from other dealers for the most part (see Map 1).
18 Malia.
9 This statement is in no way intended to trivialize the seriousness of the drug dealing problem that existed
in and around South Street or the impact that it had on the lives of residents in the development and the
nei2hborhood. Rather, it is merely a framework for examining the different magnitudes of drug dealing
situations so that solutions can be tailored according to particular circumstances.
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Property and Disorder Crime
As more people began coming into the development from outside of the
neighborhood to purchase drugs, the dealing became more overt and began to spill out
into the neighborhood. Car break-ins, loud music and noise, and occasional gunfire
began to occur on the borders of the development and eventually in the neighborhood.
Moreover, the dealing appears to have produced a rash of housebreaks in the
neighborhood between 1991 and 1992.20 Homeowners in the neighborhood expressed
outrage at house breaks and shoot-outs between police and the drug dealers from the
rooftops of development buildings. Residents in the neighborhood said that they began to
feel unsafe walking around the development when it was dark.2 The noise -- the all-
night traffic, the loud music -- began to keep residents from the neighborhood up all
night. All of this activity eventually came to a head when a Hispanic from the
development shot a black resident from the development in broad daylight in front of
children playing in the area. This incident sparked a series of community organizing
efforts to combat drug dealing.
INSTITUTIONS AND RESPONSES
Three factors are important to understand how the greater South Street community
has responded to drug problems in and around the development. These three factors are
(1) involvement and institutional capacity of land users in the neighborhood, (2)
involvement and institutional capacity of development tenants, and (3) the effectiveness
of police forces operating in the area.
1. Involvement and Institutional Capacity of Land Users in Neighborhood
A number of forces have existed in the surrounding neighborhood to address the
drug problem and compensate for a weak South Street tenant organization. Individual
activists and residents with strong political connections were the agents capable of
21 Hayes.
21 Malia.
connecting the available neighborhood, municipal, and state institutions to bear down on
the concentrated and relatively manageable drug problems in the development. These
individual activists connected with a few development tenants, which has proven to be
enough of an entree for activists to address drug problems spawned from within the
development. Most of the impetus and capacity to address drugs in the development has
come from the surrounding neighborhood. In this section, I shall examine how the
neighborhood has linked different institutions in the fight against drugs.
Neighborhood Activists and Institutions
Three main factors explain the relentless commitment of neighborhood activists to
address drugs and related problems in and around the development. First, many of the
activists in the neighborhood are homeowners and have a strong financial motive to
insure that drugs do not overtake the neighborhood. The precarious position of the
neighborhood has made homeowners and other middle-class activists the bulwark against
neighborhood decline and abandonment. Second, the physical proximity of the
development to the neighborhood means that neighborhood residents feel immediately
the impact of drug-related problems in the development. Third, these residents are well
immersed in the strong culture of activism that dominates in Jamaica Plain.
Activist Strategies
After the shooting in the development, tenant task force leader Earlene McNary
and concerned activists from the neighborhood met at a Jamaica Plain Neighborhood
Council monthly public safety meeting. The Jamaica Plain Neighborhood Council
monthly public safety meeting provided the initial opportunity for development and
neighborhood residents to connect when the drug problem became bad. Neighborhood
activists had considerable experience in community organizing in Boston and strong ties
with local and state officials. A number of neighborhood residents were and still are
involved in politics. State Representative John McDonough lives in the neighborhood as
do a number of aides on his staff. These players also attended the community policing
meeting following the shooting, and have contributed enormously to drug-fighting efforts.
One of the first initiatives that the monthly meetings generated was a crime watch.
At the first meeting, neighborhood activists, McNary, and the police established the
personal contacts to initiate crime watches. Residents employed crime watches to
provide beat officers with precise and consistent information -- the time that trouble
occurs, who are the troublemakers, when they hang around, where are the "hot spots,"
what are the license plate numbers of drug dealers and buyers -- so these officers could do
their job.2 2
After residents implemented crime watches on two streets, other neighborhood
residents became involved, and crime watches spread from street to street. The proximity
of resident houses to the development allowed neighborhood residents to keep track of
what was occurring in and along its borders and to compensate for a withdrawn
development population. Once the surrounding neighbors had provided an initial
baseline of support, some development tenants also joined in the crime watches.
Crime watches traced most patterns of dealing and crime back to one family from
the development. Because the roots of the drug dealing problem stemmed from one
family, eviction served as a key strategy to marginally decrease drug dealing activity.
The eviction process was extremely long and difficult. The ringleaders would be
arrested, appear in court, and be back in the development dealing drugs the following day.
Eviction proceedings became clogged in the BHA bureaucracy. Residents from the
neighborhood began calling the BHA administrator only to hear that the BHA could not
evict problem tenants because of the courts. 23
Activist Diane Quiroga used knowledge from her previous work in the court
system to advance the court proceedings against the Menendez family. She educated
development and community residents about the evidence needed to evict the family and
convict the two brothers. Development and neighborhood residents would keep tabs on
the two brothers -- when they would come and go -- and communicate that information to
police officers assigned to the area.
Second, the activists organized a court watch. Neighborhood residents appeared
at court proceedings to testify and express concern about the negative impact of failure to
convict criminals on the community. Resident testimony in court greatly increased the
22 Quiroga.
23 ibid.
judge's ability to convict the brothers and evict the family from the development. South
Street tenants did not testify in court because they feared retribution from the drug
dealers.24
A third strategy that activists employed in the eviction process was to lobby
judges who had been indifferent to the needs of the community through a community-
impact statement that demonstrated the pernicious effects of failure to enforce sentencing
guidelines. Staff of State Representative McDonough and City Councilor Maura
Hennigan's office helped put together this document and communicated with the District
Attorney's office to help prepare cases against drug dealers in the neighborhood. As with
the information that residents reported to police, the power of the document to influence a
particular judge lay in its strong degree of detail and organization.
Playing City Politics
Activist homeowners' understanding of how to navigate the municipal political
process has been the most critical component of successful community organizing efforts
against drugs. According to Councilor Hennigan's aide, Mary Mulvey, "most
communities do not demand anything of public officials once they are elected, but South
Street activists know what to ask for once they get someone elected."
One of the most effective methods that activists have employed to extract
demands from municipal institutions has been the middle class threat to leave the
neighborhood. On numerous occasions, neighborhood activist Quiroga has used her
personal connection with the mayor to remind him of his campaign commitment to retain
Boston's middle class by addressing quality of life issues. During 1995, BHA and BMP
officers assigned to South Street often were pulled randomly to perform duties at Mission
Main. The manager at the time, Diane Adler, saw this as her cue to contact Quiroga, who
would call the mayor, quote the latest number of homeowners who had left the
neighborhood, and threaten to sell her home and move as well.26 Soon, the BPD would
reassign officers to South Street.
24 Storey, Sandra. Personal interview. 9 March, 1996.
2S Mulvey, Mary. Personal interview. 21 November, 1996.
2( Adler. Diane. Personal interview. 13 February, 1996.
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Neighborhood activists also have demonstrated a sense of how to increase
political leverage. One activist was conducting a voter registration campaign in the
development on the day that I interviewed her. Such efforts have met with limited
success, however.
'Shared Vision' between Manager and Activists27
Shared vision is a concept used to describe the ideal relationship between
subsidized housing tenants and management in the fight against drugs.28 Neighborhood
activists have assumed the role that development tenants ideally would play in such a
relationship. Neighborhood activists influenced the BHA administrator's assignment of
managers at South Street. At the end of 1994, when neighborhood activists were
pressuring the BHA aggressively on a number of fronts, the BHA administrator appointed
Diane Adler, a long-time Jamaica Plain resident and community activist, as manager of
South Street in order to work cooperatively with the activists.29 Adler stated:
I knew the people and the politics of the neighborhood. Their politics matched
my politics, and there was an understanding of the manager's need to focus on the
community around the development not only the development. In South Street
this was easy, because the community in the surrounding neighborhood was
already there.3
Since the residents of the development were disengaged, the only people whom she could
work with around drug issues were neighborhood activists and McNary.
The local newspaper -- The Jamaica Plain Gazette
The JP Gazette also has been a vehicle through which activists and staff of the
state representative and city councilor have pressured different city agencies. The
newspaper, community players, and police all know each other and have established
relationships of mutual trust. For instance, Swan asks the Area E Police Captain Parlon
to review the stories he writes before they are published in order to make sure that they
31
are even-handed. Moreover, the values of the newspaper's reporters are focused on
27 Keyes, Langley C. Strategies and Saints.
28 ibid.
29 Adler was manager at South Street from January 1995 to January 1996.
Adler.
3 Swan, John. Personal interview. 21 February, 1996. The following discussion is based on this interview.
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understanding the issues in the neighborhood as well as supporting and facilitating
cooperative efforts in the community. Reporter John Swan said that the aim in many of
his stories is to report the issues of the neighborhood in a balanced way and summarize
with a recommendation about what can be done to resolve the issues.
Local resident access to the newspaper's reporters is excellent. Swan, who
founded the newspaper about six years ago, lives in the neighborhood and spends a good
deal of time hanging around, attending neighborhood events, listening to neighborhood
residents, and "shmoozing," all of which gives him access to privileged information. In
addition, he has personal contact and access to all of the major players in neighborhood
politics.
The JP Gazette publicizes positive accomplishments in the neighborhood as well
as negative occurrences. According to Swan, city officials often take full credit for
accomplishments which they are not responsible for, and therefore, JP Gazette writers try
to assign credit where it is due. One example is the attention that Swan has given the
South Street Survivors, a group of young women from the development who perform
community outreach. Swan regards the South Street Survivors as a model of grassroots
organizing efforts, and has tried to give them positive media coverage to help their fund
raising efforts.
Not all of the reporting is positive, however. For instance, Swan signaled the
recent election for development tenant task force board members as ominous sign for the
community. The neighborhood activists sponsored the election and had trouble
persuading residents to run for the seat and to vote, and former head of the South Street
tenant task force, Earlene McNary refused to run again. Swan covered the story and
voiced the negative impact that such a relapse could have on the community. In short,
much of the reporting appears to reflect the needs of the community and identify ways
that these needs can be met.
Local Businesses
The weakest link of the institutional network in the surrounding neighborhood is
the local business owners. Little if any financial support has been forthcoming from
"legitimate" businesses along the commercial strip of South Street. Neighborhood
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activists have pressured businesses along the strip to get involved in community efforts,
but business owners have offered little help.
Local business apathy becomes particularly important in light of the recent drug
dealing has shifted to the commercial strip across from the development. The
commercial areas do not have the persistent vigilance and organization of residents who
live along boarders of the development. Much of the dealing occurs in front of a pizza
shop on the strip, but the owners have been unable to organize the other business owners
along the strip.32 Such trends make it imperative that neighborhood activists focus
energies on engaging business owners.
2. Involvement and Organizational Capacity of Tenants
The missing element to a sustainable drug-fighting strategy in the area has been an
engaged and organized tenant population. Although there always is at least one involved
and committed tenant in the development, the tenant population has remained apathetic
toward drug-fighting initiatives. The gallant efforts of the neighborhood activists and
lone development tenants have failed to institutionalize a tenant group that knows how to
work the municipal political system.
Earlene McNary has generated what limited organizing energy has flowed from
within the development into the surrounding neighborhood. After the 1991 shooting,
McNary's concern about the future of her daughter and other girls from the development
prompted her to solicit help from the city and the surrounding neighborhood in funding
and organizing programs for girls. At the time, there were programs for the boys from the
development -- gang peace meetings, etc. -- but no programs for the girls. McNary said
that:
At first, no one would listen to me, and I had to go to community meeting after
community meeting to make the surrounding neighborhood realized that the
development was a part of the community whether they liked it or not.3 3
32 Hurley, Officer. Personal interview. 14 February, 1996.
3 McNary.
Eventually, McNary organized the girls from the development to perform
volunteer work in the neighborhood, mostly at the Farnsworth Elderly Center across the
street from the development and at a homeless shelter in the area. The group raised funds
through raffles, spaghetti dinners, and other events. This group named itself the South
Street Survivors. The more the South Street Survivors volunteered quality services, the
more willing were institutions in the neighborhood to fund the group.
The South Street Survivors have helped break down socioeconomic barriers
between residents of the development and surrounding neighborhood. McNary and the
girls have demonstrated efforts to embrace middle-class values to disabuse neighbors of
negative stereotypes of public housing youth. The good faith efforts of the South Street
Survivors have encouraged residents and institutions of the surrounding neighborhood to
become supportive of issues facing development residents.
Earlene's focus on volunteer work at the Farnsworth elderly center was
strategically astute. Within the development, relations between the elderly and teenagers
had been sharply strained. Since the South Street Survivors began to volunteer work, the
elders' impression of youth from the development, at least female youth, has improved
dramatically. Indeed, elderly residents both from the development and the Farnsworth
Elderly Center have come to depend on the South Street Survivors for services.
Neighborhood activists and the JP Gazette have supported and encouraged the
efforts of the South Street Survivors. Residents from the surrounding neighborhood meet
with the girls on a regular basis as part of a mentioning program. Activists also have
assisted fund-raising efforts and helped link McNary into the political network of the city
councilor and state representative's office. According to Councilor Hennigan's aide,
"Earlene calls us for volunteers and tips on sources of funding for the South Street
Survivors all the time.""
Overcoming Development / Surrounding Neighborhood Tensions
Initial development/neighborhood efforts to address drug dealing were not free of
class and racial tensions. When McNary first started attending community meetings after
3 Mulvey.
the 1991 shooting, she felt "the white peoples' eyes saying 'who is this black welfare
mother, and what is she doing here?"' 35 She was determined, however, to make the white
neighborhood residents recognize her and residents of the development as members of the
community. Through the community organizing process she learned a lot about the
power of numbers and realized that, in order to accomplish changes in the development,
she would have to work with residents political of clout from the surrounding
neighborhood, race and class differences notwithstanding. She also decided that "there
were enough good people in the neighborhood who cared about the community to make it
worth trying to work with them." 36
White activists from the neighborhood initially experienced class and racial
tensions, as well. One activist said that in the beginning, some residents from the
development expressed suspicion and hostility toward the activists. Some development
residents asked neighborhood activists, "Why bother trying? Nothing is ever going to
happen."37 Other development residents would look at activists as if to say "who are you
and why do you want to help us?" 38 As soon as organizing efforts started producing
tangible results, some development residents said "See, look what the neighborhood gets
when they shout, the city would never give us this if we were the only ones shouting." 39
Moreover, according to Quiroga, "some tenants thought that we were trying to do
everything for them."40 Some white residents from the development wanted to know
"what on earth middle-class whites were doing coming into the development to help poor
minorities ?"4
Development and neighborhood residents, however, saw that numbers were
important and that both sides stood to gain by working together. This was not easy to
accomplish, however -- "It has been really hard to get the trust of the people in the
3 McNary.
36 ibid.
37 Quiroga.
3 Malia.
39 Quiroga.
4 ibid.
41 ibid.
development. Seeing tangible results reduced some of this skepticism, though."42 Today
it still is not easy for activists to gain the trust and involvement of development residents.
Poor resident participation in the latest election of the tenant task force
demonstrated how limited activist efforts to build South Street tenant capacity have been.
The existing tenant task force asked neighborhood activists to organize the development
tenants.43 Such lack of resident initiative leaves vulnerable the gains leaves
neighborhood gains against drugs.
3. Effectiveness of Police Forces Operating in the Area
South Street activists have developed an extremely positive working relationship
with the BPD, BMP, and BHA officers who control the area. First, interaction is
excellent between police and residents from the neighborhood and development.
Second, the institutional policing environment in the area is relatively simple. Only
officers from the BPD, BHA, BMP partnership patrol the area, which means that mostly
the same officers are assigned to the area and reinforces positive interaction between
police and residents. The main obstacle that the neighborhood faces is a scarcity of police
resources. Neighborhood activists continually lobby Area B-2 police and City Hall for
police resources which at least provides a check against a reduction of police presence in
the area.
The JP Neighborhood Council meetings have been a vehicle through which both
neighborhood activists and McNary have established strong relations with police.
Current head of the Municipal police, Jerry McHale, attended regularly the monthly
meetings during the early 1990s when drugs became a big problem around South Street.
Consequently, these residents can contact him directly when BMP officers are pulled
from the development. Neighborhood activists also know personally and meet with
Captain Parlon of the Area E BPD on a regular basis. Monthly meetings also allow
activists and residents to follow up issues raised the previous month and hold the police
accountable for past commitments. City Counselor Maura Hennigan and State
42 Malia.
4 Thompson, Mary. Personal interview. 4 April, 1996.
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Representative John McDonough also attend meetings and maintain pressure on the BPD
for additional police coverage.
Most important, neighborhood residents and police have established relations of
mutual trust. The police heavily depend on residents to provide them with detailed
information about the drug market and residents know that they can get police attention
when necessary. One BMP officer assigned to the South Street development expressed
admiration and respect for the activists and the community as a whole:
They know how to get attention from the city when they want it. That is a great
neighborhood that really has their shit together and zero tolerance for crime. That
neighborhood won't go down the tubes because the community won't let it.4 4
4. Expanding the Scope of Drug-Fighting Initiatives
A rare feature of South Street neighborhood drug-fighting efforts is that they have
gone beyond drugs to address broader issues that confront the development tenants. First,
activists have broadened the scope of demands on the BHA beyond drug issues. Second,
the neighboring community has rallied to support the South Street Survivors. Third, both
development residents and neighborhood activists have organized more social events.
Neighborhood activists have pressured the BHA to improve living conditions in
the development. As activists spent more time at the development to address drug issues,
they observed the poor state of physical living conditions. Consequently, for years
activists have pressured that the BHA undertake comprehensive plumbing repairs in the
development, but the BHA has not responded. The JP Gazette also has identified
plumbing deficiencies as a crucial issue to the well-being of South Street residents.
Second, neighborhood pressure on BHA administrator David Cortiella in the early 1990s
was instrumental in his decision to locate a youth center in the development. The youth
center has brought youth from the neighborhood into the development for activities.
Activists also have served as watchdogs to ensure BHA compliance with management
selection procedures.
4 Hurley.
Also, neighborhood residents have supported the South Street Survivors in terms
of financing and mentoring programs. Finally, residents from the neighborhood and
development have increased the number of block parties and social gatherings to develop
relationships that go beyond dealing with drug issues.
5. Conclusion
A neighborhood of talented activists with strong links to local political institutions
and the local newspaper has held its ground against drug dealing and crime that invaded a
small public housing development in its midst. Community initiatives, however, have
depended largely on the voluntary efforts of neighborhood residents and a few tenant
leaders within the development. These efforts have been sufficient to contain drug
problems in the area and have served to improve resident quality of life in the
development and neighborhood. Moreover, residents from the development interact more
socially with residents of the surrounding neighborhood. 'Yet, because activist efforts
have been voluntary, neighborhood activists and players have been unable to
institutionalize a self-sustaining tenant group capable demanding of city bureaucracies
and effectively moving them to respond. This absence of a well-organized and engaged
resident population in the development severely threatens the continued success of the
impressive gains in drug-fighting efforts.
CHAPTER III: CHARLESTOWN: THE BUNKER HILL PUBLIC HOUSING
DEVELOPMENT
INTRODUCTION
Charlestown is a story about what happens when massive drug problems confront
a public housing development -- the Bunker Hill development -- and the surrounding
neighborhood with badly frayed community fabric both within and between the
development and the neighborhood. The destructive dynamic these relationships produce
will make it extremely difficult for the Charlestown community to address the wide-
spread drug problem in a meaningful way. Understanding how these dynamics affect
drug-related problems in and around the development, however, is essential to seriously
address these problems.
CONTEXT AND PROBLEM
Before examining how the dynamic relationship between development and
neighborhood affects drugs and related problems and vice versa, I give a description of
Charlestown and the Bunker Hill development. Next I look at the historical relationship
between the development and the rest of Charlestown, and how it affects current
dynamics. I then trace out the parameters of the drug problem to set the stage for the
discussion of how institutions and individuals in the development and surrounding
neighborhood have tried to address the problem.
1. The Development and Surrounding Neighborhood
Charlestown -- The Larger Neighborhood Context
Historically, Charlestown has been an extremely insular, homogeneous
community of Irish working class families linked by ties that go back for generations.
Since Charlestown was annexed by Boston in the 19th Century, it has maintained an
acrimonious relationship with the city. Townies feel that the City of Boston has dumped
an unfair share of undesirable development projects, facilities, and government programs
in Charlestown. 4 5 This relationship between Boston and Charlestown has magnified the
already insular culture and produced strong Townie suspicion of outsiders. Insularity and
the suspicion of outsiders, in turn, have fueled tensions between Townies and newcomers
to Charlestown during the last 50 years.
Two other characteristics are necessary to understand the Bunker Hill
development and its relation to the rest of Charlestown. First, a deep and violent history
of racism has plagued Charlestown as minorities have arrived during the last years.
Because almost all minorities have moved into the development, separation between
development and neighborhood has grown. Second, Townies have a strong tradition of
competition with one another, which is captured by the phrase "up to me, up to me, but
never above me." (Lucas) Townies have applied this principle to the other newly arrived
group to Charlestown -- upper-income professionals who work close by in downtown
Boston and use Charlestown as a bedroom community. Sharp tensions also exist between
these two groups. Since Townies live in the development and surrounding neighborhood,
understanding tensions with these two newly arrived groups is necessary to explore the
dynamic between development and neighborhood.
Boundaries of Neighborhood Surrounding the Development
Charlestown is the smallest official planning district in Boston at 1.37 square
miles. Because the neighborhood is so small geographically, I shall consider the
neighborhood surrounding the development as all of Charlestown (see Map 3).
Demographic Characteristics -- The Development and Surrounding Neighborhood
Within this small area exist subneighborhoods with sharp physical boundaries and
acute income and racial differences. These physical, socioeconomic, and racial divisions
have severely isolated the development from the surrounding neighborhood.
Income Differences
Dramatic income differences exist within the narrow geographic boundaries of
Charlestown. Median household income in the Bunker Hill development is $10,085 in
1996 as opposed to $40,414 in the rest of Charlestown. (See Table 3.1)46
5 The term 'Townie' is a commonly used expression in Charlestown used to refer to People whose families
have lived in Charlestown for generations.
* Source: 1996 BHA data.
Table 3.1 Median Household Income of Development and Neighborhood
Development Charlestown Boston
(1996) (1996) (1996)
Median Household Income $10,085 $40,414 $32,682
(Source: Boston Dept. of Public Health and 1996 Boston Housing Authority (BHA) MIS)
Average family income demonstrates the geographic proximity between the low-
income and high-income tracts. In 1990, the two census tracts containing the
development, tracts 402 and 408, had a median family income of $30,840 and $29,447,
respectively. Conversely, census tract 401, which directly abuts the development, had a
median family income of $72,648 in 1990 (see Table 3.2 and Map 4).47
Table 3.2 Average Family Income by Census Tracts
Tract 402 Tract 408 Tract 401 Tract 407 Tract 403 Tract 404
(Development) (Development)
$30,840 $29,447 $72,648 $70,701 $38,200 $44,933
(Source: Healthy Charlestown, p.9)
Racial and Ethnic Differences
Charlestown is divided sharply along racial and ethnic lines. Almost all of the
neighborhood's minorities are concentrated in the two census tracts that contain the
development. Charlestown is 94.5 % white and 5.3% minority.48 Currently 60.6% of the
development is minority, and 39.4% is white. The development is 33.3% Hispanic,
13.9% black, and 13.0 % Asian and Pacific Islander.4 9
Table 3.3 Racial and Ethnic Composition
Charlestown (1990) Development (1990) Development (1996)
White 94.5% 81% 34.9%
Minority 5.3% 19% 60.6%
Hispanic 2.1% 6% 33.3%
Black 0.7% 6% 13.9%
Asian 2.1% 7% 13.4%
(Source: Boston Department of Public Health, p. 3 and BHA MIS)
47 ibid.
4 No census data is available at the block group or tract level for the last five years. From BHA data and
anecdotal data, most new minorities in Charlestown have moved into either the Bunker Hill development of
Charles Newtown.
49 1996 BHA data. The BHA considers Hispanic as a racial category.
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Differences in Age Composition
A high percentage of Charlestown's youth is concentrated in the Bunker Hill
development, which contributes to drug and crime problems there. Currently, 45% of the
2, 317 residents who live in the development are under 20 years old. (Source: 1996 BHA
MIS) Although age breakdowns differ between data for the development and the rest of
Charlestown, Table 3.3 indicates the larger percentage of youth in the development.
Table 3.4 Age Composition
Development (1996) Charlestown (1990) Boston (1990)
0-4 14.3% 5.9% 6.3%
5-14 24.2% 7.8% 9.8%
Under 20 48% 18.6% 23.9%
Housing Stock
Gentrification and the influx of low-income households into subsidized housing
has left a shortage of housing options for working-class Townies. Charlestown has a
relatively high percentage of subsidized housing compared with Boston; approximately
25% of housing in Charlestown is subsidized as opposed to 18% in Boston.50 The three
main housing developments that constitute the bulk of affordable housing in Charlestown
are the Bunker Hill development, the Charles Newtown development, and Mishawam
Park (see Map 3). The non-subsidized stock of housing has become much more expensive
in the past 15 years. Owner-occupied units increased by 34% between 1980 and 1990,
and the median value of a single family home increased from $36,000 in 1980 to
$180,700 in 1990 (in 1988 dollars).: The median value of an owner-occupied unit in
1990 was $165,700 versus $160, 100 in Boston. (Boston Dept. of Public Health, p. B-18)
Median rents in Charlestown also skyrocketed from $215 in 1980 to $569 in 1990 as
young professionals flocked to Charlestown.: These trends have reduced the stock of
moderate- to middle-income housing and have made it more difficult for working-class
Townies to remain in Charlestown.
5" ibid.
" ibid.
52 The high percentage of subsidized rents in Charlestown bring down the median rents for Charlestown as a
whole.
Table 3.5 Housing Stock
Charlestown (1990) Boston (1990)
Total Housing Units (1990) 7,752 228,464
Owner Occupied 2,259 (33.0%) 70,544 (30.9%)
Renter Occupied 4,582 (67.0%) 157,920 (69.1%)
Subsidized Rental 25% 18%
Median Value--Owner Occ. $165,700 $160,100
Median Rent $569 $625
(Source: Boston Dept. of Public Health)
Siting and Size of Bunker Hill Development
The size and the siting of the development isolate it from the rest of Charlestown.
Incompatible non-residential uses surround the development; Interstate 93, the Mystic
River, and the Harbor bound the development along two of its edges (see Map 3). A
BHA architect said of the highway that separates the development from the new
residences in the Navy Yard, "it may as well be a river separating the two."5 3 This
physical barrier exacerbates already minimal communication resulting from pronounced
economic differences between the Navy Yard and development residents.
Few residences actually border the development. The Charles Newtown
development borders the Bunker Hill development along Medford Street. Architects
designed Newtown with its back facing the development, and fencing separating it from
the development. This development simply magnifies the Bunker Hill development's
drug problem. Farther down Medford Street, the athletic fields of Charlestown High
School begin and later give way to a series of antiquated industrial plants. Along Polk
Street, Charlestown High School and a few houses abut the development. Neighborhood
residences and businesses run adjacent to the development along the length of Bunker
Hill Street.
The development's size dominates the character of the neighborhood around it.
The development is the largest that the BHA operates in units and, combined with
Charles Newtown, houses over 2,500 low- to moderate-income residents. The
" Smith, St. John. Personal interview. 9 February 1996.
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concentration of poor people in the area inevitably contributes to drug and other social
problems.
2. History of Development/Neighborhood Relations
The Beginnings
Since the start, relations between residents of the Bunker Hill development and
the rest of Charlestown have been strained. In order to construct the new public housing
development in 1941, the city leveled a 24-acre site of poor immigrant housing. Many
neighbors and people who lost their homes were incensed at what they felt to be the
heavy and arbitrary hand of the city in conjunction with the federal government. On the
other hand, neighbors also envied those residents selected for the development. The City
promised residents displaced from their homes that they would have preference for the
new apartments in the Bunker Hill development if they met federal income requirements;
however, only 36% of those families displaced actually moved into the highly sought
after apartments. (Lucas, p.146)
Moving from the cold water flats to the development was upward mobility.
Current Bunker Hill Tenant Task Force Leader, Mary Maclnnes moved from a cold water
flat in Charlestown to the development shortly after it opened in 1941. She said that "the
cold water flat was horrible. It was always cold, and winters were miserable."1 The
apartments in the development had steam heat and hardwood floors. When she moved
into the project, she thought "this is really what heaven on earth must be like. The rest of
Charlestown, though hated people from the projects. They called us 'project rats."'
At first the development was a temporary haven for working class families before
they moved to the suburbs. The development served many positive purposes. It served
as a source of jobs. Everyone knew each other. It was a social community:
Once, years before, the project had teemed with social activities; a Men's Club, a
Women's club, Boy Scouts, Brownies, movies, softball and football teams, a
sewing club, a boy's airplane group, victory gardens, boxing and hopscotch
tournaments, dances and block parties. (Lucas, p. 151)
5 MacInnes, Mary. Personal interview. 29 January 1996.
5 ibid.
The 1960s -- Urban Renewal
Urban renewal began to change the composition of the development population
and erode the sense of the "urban village."5 6 First, urban renewal in Boston
neighborhoods displaced poor white families from all over the city into the development.
Townies did not regard new tenants from other parts of the city as "true townies." (ibid.)
Secondly, changes in federal legislation severely limited the authority of development
managers, making it more difficult for them to screen out and evict problem tenants.
(ibid.) The development, then, came to house a poorer and more difficult to manage
tenant population.
These changes, in turn, further severed interaction between development tenants
and the rest of Charlestown. Middle-class residents from Breed's Hill and Bunker Hill
increasingly tried to isolate themselves from the development. (ibid.) One non-Townie
who raised seven children and lived in the development during this time said that
"Townies from the town thought they were better than the 'project rats,' but they really
thought they were better than whites in the development who weren't Townies.57
By the end of the 1960s, the idea of the development as a safe place to bring up a
family was beginning to crumble. One mother who lived in the development at this time
would tell her kids "You live here, but you don't hang here."58 Three decades after Mary
MacInnes proclaimed the development a "heaven on earth", a residents who left the
development declared such new-found frontiers as Dorchester to be "heavens on earth":
I grew up in the project until I was 14. It was a real hard place. It was all concrete
and everything was broken. The kids were hard too. As a Charlestown kid, your
right of passage was beating up a cop. When we finally moved to Dorchester, it
seemed like heaven. I mean there were patches of grass. 59
56 The term 'urban village' used in Herbert Gans' The Urban Villagers emphasizes that social interaction is
essential to the achievement of urban safety, harmony, and functionality. (Gardiner, p.12).
57 McDougal, Theresa. Personal interview. 28 February, 1996.
58 ibid.
59 Forrester, Richard. Personal interview. 24 November, 1995.
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1970s -- Busing and Job Flight
The calamitous effect that busing produced in Charlestown further divided the
project from the neighborhood. The federal government mandated forced busing to even
the racial balance in Boston public schools. Many working and middle-class families
evaded the busing issue by sending their kids to private or parochial schools or leaving
for the suburbs. 60 Working-class families who could move out of the project did so,
leaving mostly poorer families who could not, which further damaged the already
deteriorating sense of community. As one former tenant expressed: "A lot of the good
families moved out of the project during this time, and a lot of the bad families stayed.
Busing gave the project a bad name." 61 Also, much of the violence associated with the
busing crisis occurred in and around the development because it was physically close to
the old high school and because project families who could not avoid busing were its
most fierce opponents. (Lucas, p. 265) Many people from Charlestown directly link the
decline of the development and the high school with the busing crisis.62
Flight of industries from Charlestown during the 1960s and 1970s dealt a
crippling blow to Charlestown's working class and increased the gap between rich and
poor. The Navy Yard, Dominoe Sugar, Schraft Chocolate, and Revere Sugar all closed
during this period as did businesses that serviced former industry workers. Although
residents from the development and neighborhood lost jobs during this period,
development residents appeared to have been impacted the most.
1980s and 1990s -- Besieged by Outsiders from Above and Below
Two major trends during this period have widened the gap between the rich and
poor in Charlestown and exacerbated already deteriorated development/neighborhood
relations. First, the influx of upper-income young professionals into Charlestown has
driven up real estate and has contributed to the working-class Townie exodus. Second,
federally-mandated desegregation of the Bunker Hill development has produced an influx
6" McGann Jeff and Leo Boucher. Personal interviews. 14 February, 1996 and 23 February, 1996.
6 Boucher, Leo. Personal interview. 23 February, 1996.
62 McGann.
of low-income minorities and an exodus of working-class whites. Ten years ago, the
racial composition of the development was 99% white, and today it is 60% minority and
40% white.63 Federal policy changes that set stringent income limits helped insure that
minorities who moved to the development were low-income. Consequently, many
Townies from the neighborhood expressed the feeling that upper-income newcomers
from above and low-income minorities from below are squeezing them out of
Charlestown.64
Many Townies resent the upper-income newcomers. One life-long Charlestown
resident said, "many long-term residents are rightfully resentful of the new people who
have come in and driven the prices sky high so that no one can afford to live here
anymore."65 Upper-income newcomers appear, for the most part, to withdraw from
Townie civic life.
Influx of minorities into the development as a result of forced integration that
began in the 1970s has generated acute racial tensions and further isolated the
development from the surrounding neighborhood. Tensions have been especially
prevalent between low-income minorities, particularly Hispanics, and low- to moderate-
income whites. Many Townies feel that while upper-income newcomers drive up cost of
market rents, minorities are taking up the remaining low-income housing. One
community leader said of minority immigration, "The feds turned on the faucet and they
never figured out a way to turn it off. Every place starts out 98% white and ends up 98%
black."66
Forced integration has also generated tension with homeowners in the surrounding
neighborhood. Some property owners in the neighborhood feared that introducing blacks
into the development would eventually drive down surrounding property values:
Homeowners were most opposed to integrating the project. One homeowner at
the top of the hill near Monument Square was the one who really raised trouble
about the blacks, because he said they would drive down property values. He
63 BHA MIS, March 7, 1996.
64 Looney, Peter. Personal interview. 25 January, 1996.
65 McGann.
66 Looney.
didn't have to worry about anything. Most residents from the development stay
down the hill anyway.67
The dynamic between forced integration and Townie culture of competition has
also generated tension between Townies from the development and neighborhood. On
the one hand, being a Townie transcends class differences. Many neighborhood Townies
used to live in the development and still have family there. Moreover, drugs pose the
same threat to all Townies, regardless of whether they live in the development. On the
other hand, some Townies from the neighborhood appear to equate remaining in the
development with personal failure. Even within the restricted ladder of social mobility
for poor and working families in Charlestown, moving from the development to
Newtown and particularly Mishawam is viewed as moving up.68 Some Townies who
remain in the development appear to have internalized this message, and vent this
frustration on minorities in the development.
Racial Tensions
Racial tensions have isolated minority residents from other whites in the
development and the rest of Charlestown. Most minority families in Charlestown are
concentrated in the Bunker Hill development or in Newtown. Minorities have
experienced frequent verbal threats and periodic racial violence. (Healthy Charlestown, p.
41) Moreover, many non-native English speaking residents keep to themselves and do
not shop or use services in the, neighborhood. (ibid.) The assistant manager of the Bunker
Hill development stated, "many minority families from the development feel
uncomfortable or scared and don't venture out of their apartment and around the town."69
Racial incidents have sharpened the already well defined racial boundaries in
Charlestown. Hispanics generally feel unwelcome along Main Street. Minority fear was
exacerbated last year after a group of white youth stabbed a Hispanic youth on Main
Street. As more minorities have entered the Bunker Hill development and Newtown,
racial tensions between minorities and whites have increased in that area.70 About three
67 MacInnes.
6 Interview with Danny Ryan.
69 McDougal.
70 Coyne, Ron. Personal interview. 7 December, 1995.
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years ago, a group of Hispanic youth visiting a Hispanic friend from the development
stabbed two white young men. Within an hour, 400 to 500 Townies, most of whom were
from the development and Mishawam, had gathered outside the apartment of the
Hispanic, demanding revenge. Such incidents have magnified racial tensions in and
around the development.
This history of complex and strained relations between development and
surrounding neighborhood has contributed strongly to the inability of the development
and neighborhood to respond effectively to combat the urgent problems in their midst.
3. Dynamic of the Drug Market
The Problem
Drugs are a community-wide problem for the low- to moderate-income population
of Charlestown. Because a large portion of this population lives in the three subsidized
developments, most drug dealing and use are concentrated in and around these areas.
Father Ron Coyne of St. Catherine's Church summed it up this way, "there is no place
where a kid from Charlestown can be drug free."7 Although drugs dealing occurs in all
three subsidized developments, it has really taken root in and around the Bunker Hill
development. Because Newtown and the High School are so close to the development,
the lines of dealing among these three complexes are blurred, and the whole area is
viewed as a hotbed for drug dealing and use.72 Dealing and use also occur heavily in the
Mishawam Development along Main Street, but not to the same intensity as in and
around the development.
Drug dealing is rampant in all areas of the Bunker Hill development and along its
borders. An undercover investigator stated that he knows of 30 to 40 apartments all over
the development where individuals sell drugs. He estimates the actual number to be
much higher. The hallways and roofs of buildings all over the development are
testament to the serious drug problem. One particular area of the development, Carney
71 ibid. The only exception to this statement would appear to be youth who study outside of Charlestown.
72 Keaney, Joseph. Personal interview. 14 February, 1996.
7 Anonymous. Personal interview.
7 There were approximately 982 occupied housing units on April 1, 1996.
52
Court, has two buildings with hallways in disastrous conditions.7 5 The walls are covered
with graffiti, and the hallways smell of urine and excrement. On some days, hundreds of
empty heroin bag wrappers are scattered on the hallway floors. In one of these buildings,
hallways are in this state because two families deal drugs out of apartments on the first
76floor -- one sells heroin and the other sells cocaine and crack. As a rule, someone is
dealing from one or more of the apartments in the building when hallways are in this
condition.77 Some outdoor hot spots for dealing are the strip of Monument Street that
runs through the development and the storefronts on the border of Charles Newtown and
the development (see Map 3).
Structure of the Drug Market
A long-time monopoly controlled by a few Townie families tightly oversees the
drug market in Charlestown. The multiple families dealing out of their apartments in the
development all operate within the hierarchy of the Charlestown drug monopoly. The top
of the hierarchy determines who will and will not deal. Newcomers cannot simply start
dealing. The boyfriend of a development tenant said, "Let's put it this way, if I were to
go in there and start dealing tomorrow, I'd have problems, big problems." 78
The profile of drug dealers in the development has begun to change. Although the
system is closely regulated, newcomers seem to be gaining approval of the monopoly and
their representation in the ranks is growing.79 Development residents conduct most of the
dealing in the development in their apartments, in hallways, or on street corners. Many of
the dealers are between the ages of 24 and 40 and are members of long-time white
families in the development.80 In a December drug sweep, 17 of the 21 people arrested
were development residents.81 Those dealers who are not BHA tenants are usually
boyfriends or children of development tenants.82 A new set of dealers has emerged:
7 The author made the following observations on a police ride-along. 29 February 1996.
76 Anonymous. Personal interview.
77 Keaney.
78 Peters, Joseph. Personal interview. 17 April, 1996.
79 ibid.
80 Anonymous.
8 Melia, Steven. Personal Interview. 11 February, 1996.
82 McKenna., Kevin. Personal interview. 29 February, 1996.
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women who sell drugs for their boyfriends. One officer estimated that about 40% of
dealers are females from the development who deal for their boyfriends.83
The monopoly operates according to strict rules and an honor system called the
Code of Silence. Dealers whom police apprehended are sworn to secrecy, and those who
confess face swift and definitive punishment. The Code of Silence also is an implicit
deal with all Charlestown residents; residents in the development and town are safe from
violence if they mind their own business and turn a blind eye to things they should not
see. Residents who have broken the code often have ended up mysteriously murdered
with no witnesses. The Code of Silence makes it extremely difficult to get anyone to
testify about crimes. The monopolistic drug structure, then, encourages a culture of
silence among residents both inside and outside the development.
A few trends have begun to erode the discipline of the monopolistic drug
structure, however. The Code of Silence Trial in which a number of key organized crime
figures were convicted weakened the monopoly somewhat. Second, increases in
mandatory sentences have begun to entice arrested dealers to inform on higher-ups even
though the consequences are perilous.
Buyers and Users
The lower-to middle income community in Charlestown provides most of the
demand for drugs in the development and the larger neighborhood. Most people who buy
drugs in the development are residents, Charles Newtown tenants, and Charlestown High
School students (some of whom live in the development). Townies from other parts of
Charlestown as well as people from Everett and Revere who have friends or relatives in
the development also buy there.84 Drug use is not limited to youths in Charlestown.
Although a number of high school students skip school and do drugs in the hallways of
development buildings, a large number of adults, however, appear to be users as well.85
The scale of dealing in the development has increased because many dealers are
heavy drug users. Some dealers do up to 40 or 50 bags of heroin a day. 86 In order to
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support their habit, drug dealers are under severe pressure to sell as much as possible,
which shifts the supply curve for drugs outward and creates a vicious cycle. Moreover,
this phenomenon appears to be exploding in the large population of female-headed
households of the development:
Some dealers have girlfriends all over the development, and they bring them
drugs, get them hooked, and then make them sell drugs to pay their habit. Some
guys even have different girlfriends in the same building who sell for them. The
guys drop off the drugs at the girl's apartment and pick up the proceeds at night.87
Given this phenomenon, effective drug prevention programs among young female
mothers could help reverse this dangerous trend.
Drugs Sold
Heroin has become recently the preferred choice of drugs in Charlestown and is
reaching epidemic proportions. Heroin is particularly convenient for youth, because bags
sell for six dollars a piece. In addition the market continues to offer crack cocaine and
regular cocaine.
Degree and Type of Violence
The monopolistic structure tightly regulates who deals drugs, which diminishes
turf rivalry in the development, and consequently there is little unplanned violence. In
Charlestown, "things happen for a reason. There is very little random crime between
unknown people."88 The violence that does occur is usually punishment against
informants. Moreover, organized crime tries to stifle crimes that draw attention. Such
control over violence makes it easy for residents of the surrounding neighborhood to
ignore the drug problem.89
Property Crime
The monopolistic drug structure does not regulate property crime. The geographic
proximity between the development and wealthy subneighborhoods contributes strongly
to the high level of property crime, such as car theft and vandalism. In 1992,
Downtown/Beacon Hill and South End/Back Bay were the only Boston Police
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Department reporting districts to exceed Charlestown in their rate of auto theft.90
(Healthy Charlestown, p. 32) Many of the car thefts and car break-ins occur in the
Charlestown Navy Yard and Breed's Hill. Although some people who do this are from
the development, residents from the Navy Yard and Breed's Hill exclusively blame the
development for the problem because of its geographic proximity. 91 The rampant use of
heroin also appears to have increased incidents of thefts and burglaries. In order to
support a heroin habit, users are desperate to find funds.
Residents of the neighborhood are reluctant to make too many waves about
property crime because of the Code of Silence. The residents, therefore, responded to
property crime through crime watches in which they try to secure their own front
doorstep.92 Consequently, neighborhood crime-fighting efforts do not reach beyond
residents' front door steps and certainly do not reach the development. The combination
of the Code of Silence and high property crime has prompted residents of the wealthier
parts of Charlestown to respond to crime by walling themselves off from the
development.
INSTITUTIONS AND RESPONSES
Three factors are important to understand how the Charlestown community has
responded to drug problems in and around the development. These factors are (1)
involvement and institutional capacity of land users in the neighborhood, (2) involvement
and institutional capacity of development tenants, (3) and the effectiveness of police
forces operating in the area.
1. Involvement and Institutional Capacity of Land Users in the Neighborhood
The deleterious effects that drugs have exacted on Charlestown's low- to
moderate-income community and Townie instinct to preserve a semblance of the old
Charlestown have moved individuals and institutions in the neighborhood to forge
9" The Healthy Charlestown Coalition. "Charlestown Community Needs and Resources Assessment
Report," November 1993.
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community efforts against crime. For the most part, however, negative dynamics within
the surrounding neighborhood and between the development and neighborhood have
exacerbated drug problems and rendered many well-intentioned organizations and
community efforts ineffectual.
Problematic institutions most immediately bound the Bunker Hill development,
which itself is managed by a troubled housing authority.93 Charlestown High School and
Charles Newtown present the most immediate problems for the development. Moreover,
neighborhood residents with political and economic clout have removed themselves from
issues that involve the development. Finally, lack of political clout and the conflict
between the distinct groups of Charlestown -- Townies, minorities, and young
professionals -- have derailed those neighborhood organizations that have rallied in
earnest to address drugs in the development. Consequently, the massive drug problems in
and around the development have overwhelmed these neighborhood organizations.
Charlestown High School
The seemingly intractable problems of Charlestown High School coupled with the
drug problems of the Bunker Hill development produce an explosive dynamic that
exacerbates tensions between the development and surrounding neighborhood.
Moreover, the marriage of these two troubled institutions offers little capacity to respond
effectively to these local issues.
Students from Charlestown High School use the hallways of the adjacent Bunker
Hill development to skip classes and get high. The rampant heroin market and the
unsupervised buildings in the development provide adolescents with a safe haven to do
drugs. High school students who hang out along Bunker Hill Street after school also
aggravate development/neighborhood relations, and the lines distinguishing who is from
the development and who is not are blurry.
Residents and businesses in the surrounding neighborhood blame the drugs and
nuisance on the development. Store owners along Bunker Hill Street meet monthly with
representatives from the MBTA, the BPD, the high school principal, the Bunker Hill
93 St. Catherine's Church, which abuts the development along Corey Street, is the clear exception to this
statement.
Tenant Task force, development managers, and the city councilor to address the issue.
From these meetings, a full-time person has been hired to promote efforts between the
high school and the development and bring students who skip class back to school.
Despite these efforts, the students are unrelenting, still use BHA hallways to use drugs,
and still loiter in front of businesses after school.
The failed efforts are the product of the two institutions at the heart of the
problem. The task of coordinating local responses to the high school/development issue
through the two large and troubled city bureaucracies that operate these institutions has
overwhelmed local community efforts.
Charles Newtown and Mishawam Park
The institutions that manage Newtown and Mishawam have not coordinated and
cooperated on a regular basis with management from the Bunker Hill development to
address the drug issue.94 This is important because youth from one development hang out
in the other developments, particularly youth from Newtown and the Bunker Hill
Development. Mishawam youth walk through the development on the way to the High
School every day. Because management at these developments do not communicate
amongst one another, the subsidized developments, particularly Newtown, serve only to
expand drugs problems around the development, rather than to help address them.
Navy Yard
A rich network of institutions and resources exists in the Charlestown Navy Yard;
however, physical and socioeconomic barriers between the development and the Navy
Yard render them of little use to the development. Limited interaction that has occurred
between the two areas has been mostly negative. Youth from the development and other
parts of high school have vandalized cars and other property in the Navy Yard, and this
has been blamed on the development.95 Residents of the Navy Yard also have protested
the use of one of the public pools by development children because they are noisy. 96In
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short, individuals and institutions from the Navy Yard appear to responded to tensions
with the development by walling themselves off.
Local Businesses
Local businesses have offered little support for efforts to address drugs in and
around the development. Support consists of contributions for local sports teams and
leagues but stops there. Although businesses along Bunker Hill Street have organized to
address the problem of loitering high school students, financial support for solutions like
after school programs has not been forthcoming.
Local realtors have undermined Healthy Charlestown efforts to orient new
residents about resources in Charlestown and drug addiction services. Realtors have
refused to distribute the welcoming bags that Healthy Charlestown has prepared to new
comers, because the bags make reference to services for drug and alcohol related use and
provide advice on how to avoid crime. Realtors are nervous that these references will
drive away the upper-income market that they target.97 To remedy this dilemma, realtors
have proposed a separate welcoming bag that omits information about drugs and crime
for new middle- to upper-income residents.
St. Catherine's Parish Rectory
St. Catherine's Church, located adjacent to the development on Corey Street,
represents a ray of hope in the neighborhood immediately surrounding the development.
The church's pastor, Father Ron Coyne, appears to be one of the few people who can
break through the seemingly impermeable barrier of social isolation that envelops many
minority residents of the development. Father Coyne describes his role as "seeing that I
know every person in the development, because the development is the neighborhood that
surrounds this church." 98 The church holds mass in Spanish as well as weekly meetings
for the different minority groups in the development to discuss their problems in the
Charlestown community. Moreover, the church provides a food and clothing pantry and
runs AA meetings.
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Neighborhood Residents and Organizations
Neighborhood organizations have proven powerless to address the core issues that
would be necessary to change the drug situation in and around the development. First,
this ineffectiveness has resulted primarily from the destructive impact that the influx of
young professionals and the exodus of working-class Townies have inflicted on the social
capital in the surrounding neighborhood. Second, the lack of upper-income newcomers'
participation in Charlestown civic life has meant that neighborhood organizations are
dominated by the same group of Townies who have little political clout over the city.
Third, Townie organizations use the political clout that they do have ineffectively.
Upper-income newcomers with political clout have removed themselves from
drug issues in and around the development. They are physically separated from the
development geographically, and the inward design of their houses and neighborhood
blocks separate them from the development. The combination of physical isolation and
safety from random violence makes drugs in the development an issue with which upper-
income newcomers need not deal. Second, extreme class and racial differences exist
between the upper-income areas and the project. Third, class tensions with Townies in
control of neighborhood organizations also explain some of the upper-income isolation
from civic life in Charlestown. Also, the history of insularity and suspicion of outsiders
in Charlestown discourages newcomers from addressing controversial issues. Fourth, and
perhaps most important, the young professionals have a fundamentally different set of
concerns than the rest of Charlestown. 99 The separation of concerns arises in part from
differences in household structure. Many of the young professionals, or DINKs (Double
Income No Kids), as Townies refer to them, do not have children, and therefore, drugs
and safety issues do not pose the same threat they do for parents who have children
growing up in Charlestown.
Withdrawal of residents with economic and political clout from Charlestown civic
life translates into Townie dominated neighborhood organizations with little political
9 Coyne.
clout. Many of the same Townies are on the board of directors of the same organizations.
Since Townies have grown up within the entrenched underground crime structure of
Charlestown, they are less likely to initiate a concerted attempt to disrupt this structure.
In many ways, an organization of outsiders with few local ties is the group that would be
most likely to succeed in taking on the crime structure. Because Townie neighborhood
organizations are careful not to confront the crime structure, their drug-fighting strategies
consist exclusively of prevention-based strategies. Examples of such organizations are
the Healthy Charlestown Coalition and Charlestown Against Drugs (CHAD). Another
barrier that domination of neighborhood organizations by long-time Townies presents is
that many older Townies are reluctant to acknowledge the true extent of drug and racial
problems in Charlestown.' 00 Such reluctance makes it unlikely that neighborhood
organizations as they exist today will address the difficult and dangerous drug issues.
A third reason that neighborhood organizations are ineffective is because the
limited political and organizational capacity they do have is not utilized well.
Charlestown is overflowing with community organizations -- "there are so many
committees and organizations in Charlestown that you could trip over them. Everyone in
Charlestown has their own organization."10 The proliferation of organizations results
because there is "...no unanimity in Charlestown about anything." (Keyes, Rehabilitation
Planning Game) The sheer number of organizations and committees make coordination
more difficult and causes repetition of functions and services. A 1993 resident survey
"noted the significant number of programs that are available, and that with one or two
exceptions, additional service programs were not the best solution for the community."
(Healthy Charlestown, p. 49)
Fourth, neighborhood organizations have difficulty involving development
residents, particularly minorities, in those organizations. Although there are people from
the neighborhood, primarily Townies, who reach out to development residents, they do
not appear to connect with tenants outside the Bunker Hill Tenant Task Force. Task force
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leader Mary MacInnes has connected with neighborhood organizations, but bringing the
development residents outside of the task force into the process has been difficult.
2. Involvement and Organizational Capacity of Development Tenants
Residents from the development face barriers to organizing effectively against the
drug problem on virtually every front. Although there are small pockets of residents who
have initiated informal building patrols, resident capacity to address the drug problem is
almost non-existent. A strategy to address drugs in and around public housing without
support of the tenants faces tremendous odds, particularly when combined with weak
institutions in the surrounding neighborhood and a large drug problem. One officer
summarized well the need for resident participation: "The buildings are only as good as
the tenants in them. You look at the building that have clean, safe hallways, and it's
because the tenants are in control of the place." 0 2
First and foremost, residents are unwilling to participate in organizing efforts
against drugs because they are petrified of retaliation from the organized crime structure.
Second, deep racial problems divide the development and isolate minorities. Third, the
Tenant Task Force of the development has not been effective in or supportive of drug-
fighting efforts. Fourth, there is wide spread distrust and suspicion among development
residents.
Resident withdrawal from fear of retribution constitutes the most fundamental
obstacle to tackling the drug problem in the development. Crime statistics represent
resident reluctance to report drug-related crimes in the Bunker Hill development. In
1995, only 3 of the 176 crimes reported in the development were drug-related crimes --
1.7%. (BHA Public Safety Department, 1995) BHA developments with comparable drug
problems, such as Mission Main and Orchard Park, reported 73 of 177 crimes (41.2%)
and 93 of 220 crimes (42.3%), respectively to be drug-related.
In the Charlestown development, many residents in the development lock
themselves in their apartments from their fear of widespread drug dealing and use in
0 McKenna.
building hallways. At seven in the evening, most of the window shades of the apartments
are drawn.' 0 3 According to one officer, many residents, particularly old residents, are
afraid to leave their apartments, because junkies harass them in the hallways.'4
Resident fear of retaliation makes community policing a difficult idea for anyone
to take seriously. Resident fear is well founded. A community organizer said that when
he tries to engage residents in community policing initiatives they ask him "Yeah, and
where are you gonna be when they come banging on my door at night, threatening my
life, when they threaten my kids' lives?"10 5 Moreover, residents have little faith that the
police can protect them and so do the police. One officer said:
Maybe I can protect one resident one night by stopping by her apartment once in a
while, but what about nights when I'm off? Then, there's no one on duty from 4
p.m. to 8 a.m. The worst time in public housing is from 4 p.m. to 4 a.m., and
some nights no one is even here. Who is going to protect the old lady then? This
is the biggest development in the city, and I'm the only guy on duty here. No
one's got my back here either.io6
Resident fear of retribution has helped produced a deeply rooted resident mistrust
and suspicion of police officers in Charlestown. Residents simply are not supposed to
communicate with officers. Long-time residents are particularly reluctant to
communicate with police.' 0 7
Second, severe social isolation among the minority population of the development
creates a significant barrier to resident organization in general. Sharp racial tensions have
badly isolated minorities from the rest of the development and the town. Residents face
constant verbal and physical harassment from whites in the development.108 Hate crimes
against Hispanics, blacks, and Asians frequently surface and exacerbate racial tensions.
Minority groups are beginning to speak out more about the racial problems, however;
many still remain fearful and withdrawn.109 Since the development is 60% minority,
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isolation of this population presents a formidable challenge to the tenant population's
capacity to address the drug problem.
Third, the Bunker Hill Tenant Task Force is more of an obstacle than a facilitator
of drug-fighting efforts. The tenant task force leader is strong and well respected within
the Charlestown community; however, her strength has been pushing through individual
resident complaints through BHA bureaucracy rather than building an effective resident
organization.110 Long-term residents dominate the tenant task force and are characterized
as closed, and concerned primarily with protecting their turf rather than incorporating
other tenants into the power structure."'I
The tenant task force has been unreceptive to outside efforts to build resident
participation and organizing capacity or to implement community policing efforts. There
is speculation that some residents involved in public safety issues have relatives involved
in the drug trade. This is a problem in many public housing developments. One officer
summarized the general dilemma:
How do you bring up drug dealing at the public safety meetings. If I were a
dealer, I'd have my girlfriend or whoever in there in those meetings keeping tabs
for me."2
In general, the heavy drug use among development tenants means that many residents
have family members who deal or use drugs, which often creates a disincentive for
residents to join drug-fighting initiatives.
Moreover, the TTF has been at odds with management, and there is little trust
between the two entities. Some members of the tenant task force feel that management is
"out to get them." Moreover, some tenants feel that management is unresponsive to
tenant needs in terms of physical repairs. Managers, on the other hand have found it
difficult to break through resident suspicion of them. Consequently, management and the
tenant task force communicate little about drug-related problems.
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Fourth, there appears to be strong suspicion and mistrust among development
residents, racial matters aside. Few residents have faith that other residents will follow
through on their part of the bargain they take steps to start initiatives. For example, in
recent efforts to clean hallways, residents have assumed the attitude: "Why should we
bother cleaning the hallways and picking up trash when we know nobody is gonna help
out."' This lack of faith in collective action presents daunting challenges to those
people trying to organize residents against drug-related problems.
3. Effectiveness of Police Forces Operating in the Area
The police forces operating in the area have been ineffective in addressing drug
issues and confront a number of significant obstacles. The first obstacle police face is
difficulty opening lines of communication with residents. Second, rivalry and poor
coordination among the six different police forces that operate in the area create
fragmentation and overlap in services and suspicion among residents. Third, lack of
consistent police presence in the development undermines police ability to win the trust
of residents and sustain short-term victories against drug dealers. A final theme that
emerged is the lack of institutional support that officers in the development receive to
cope with enormous amounts of stress.
First and foremost, police/resident interaction in and around the development is
almost non-existent. Although many officers assigned to the development have earnest
intentions, they have great difficulty connecting with development tenants. The Code of
Silence has erected a wall between the residents and the police. This absence of
communication generates resentment with tenants as well as with officers. Residents feel
that the officers are never around and cannot insure their protection, and officers feel
frustrated because residents do not provide the information officers need to do their job.
Second, coordination and communication is extremely poor among the numerous
police forces that operate in the area. Many different law enforcement agencies are
conducting a myriad of drug investigations with seemingly little coordination. Federal
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drug investigators, state police, the BPD, the Boston Municipal Police, and BHA police
all have different operations underway at the same time, and there is little information
sharing among the groups. Local police are resentful because they feel that federal police
simply use them for information to promote their own careers." 4 Also, the number of
different undercover investigators in the area magnifies widespread suspicion and silence
among residents.
The BPD/BHA/BMP police partnership, the most important policing relationship
to the development is strained. According to one BHA officer, "the real problem between
BHA and BPD police is communication."115 Officers from the BPD and BHA cannot
communicate directly, because their radios are not linked. If a BHA officer is in trouble,
the BHA officer must call a dispatcher, and the dispatcher then contacts the BPD officer
to respond. BHA officers, therefore, have little idea about what BPD officers in the area
are doing, and vice versa.
Moreover, police officers from the different developments do not communicate
with each other regularly. Wakenhut, a private security company, patrols Newtown and
the BHA police patrol the Bunker Hill development. Different preconceptions account
for some of these barriers in communication. One BHA officer said of the Wakenhut
officers, "some of them are nice guys, and they really want a career as police officers, but
they're really not there yet.""16
Third, lack of consistent police presence within the development undermines the
ability of police to form relationships of mutual trust with development residents. No
officers are assigned to the development from 12 p.m. to 8 am, and there is only one
officer on duty four days a week on the 4 p.m. to 12 p.m. shift, the busiest drug dealing
shift. Officers can do little to insure residents protection once they have provided officers
with information. Lack of a consistent and substantial police presence in the
development renders large multi-agency drugs sweeps virtually useless. After a major
sweep of the development in December 1995 resulted in 21 arrests, dealing resumed
114 Anonymous.
115 McKenna.
116 ibid.
quickly to its previous level, because there was little police presence to follow up the
sweep. 7 One officer said, "those sweeps, they don't even make a dent in the problem.
Look at this place. The sweeps are like pissing into the wind.""1
8
The thin police resources in the development place tremendous stress on the few
officers assigned there. Officers on the front line rarely receive the kind of support they
need to do their job effectively. A number of dealers have placed threats on the life of an
officer who covers the development alone at night. The only backup the officer has is
from the BPD, but requesting help through a dispatcher can take longer than it should.
This kind of stress makes it difficult if not impossible for an officer to do his job
effectively.
4. Conclusion
Charlestown suffers severe problems in all areas that determine whether a
development and surrounding neighborhood can cope with drugs and related problems.
Involvement and institutional capacity are poor both within and outside of the
development. Moreover, the institutional policing environment is extremely ineffective.
The dynamic among these three factors arms a weak arsenal to combat the rampant drug
problems that have rooted themselves in and around the development. Furthermore, the
class and racial trends in Charlestown most likely will weaken the capacity of the
development and neighborhood to organize and confront social problems in the area.
Barring dramatic change in at least two of these four variables, the drug situation
in and around the Charlestown development is likely to remain the same or worsen. One
way to begin addressing the drug-problem in the development would be to insure more
minority participation on the tenant task force, which may make minorities more
comfortable participating in addressing public safety issues. This would have to be
accompanied by a dual policing strategy that addresses the upper echelons as well as the
street level of the drug dealing structure.
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CHAPTER IV: BROMLEY HEATH
INTRODUCTION
Potent resources exist both within and outside of Bromley Heath, but barriers
between the development and neighborhood diminish their combined impact on sev.ere
drug-related problems in the area. Inside the development, the Bromley Heath Tenant
Management Corporation (TMC), the first public housing tenant management body in the
country, provides strong organizing capacity. Outside the development, a number of
organizations and resources are poised to address drug-dealing issues. Although
organizing energy inside and outside the development often are not channeled in a
coordinated manner, recent real estate development in the immediate neighborhood of
Bromley Heath provides neighborhood institutions with a market incentive to address
drug-related problems in the area. This incentive makes it likely that drug problems will
not defeat the development and larger neighborhood.
CONTEXT AND PROBLEM
1. The Development and Surrounding Neighborhood
Jamaica Plain / Roxbury -- The Larger Neighborhood Context
Bromley Heath is situated in Jamaica Plain on the border with Roxbury. The
location of the development at the crossroads of these inner-city Boston neighborhoods
places it in the middle of Boston's drug-trafficking world. Physical neighborhood
boundaries, therefore, are of secondary importance in defining how the development and
neighborhood relate to one another with regard to drug-related problems. I shall define
the boundaries of the surrounding neighborhood, then, according to the lines that the
different gangs in the area have drawn, because gang turf is the critical neighborhood
issue.
The number of rival gangs operating within the larger neighborhood creates
formidable challenges to drug fighting strategies. The most intense gang rivalry that has
existed for generations and continues strong today is between youth from Bromley Heath
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and Academy Homes, which is government subsidized housing located across Columbus
Avenue from Bromley Heath (see Map 5). The Hyde Square neighborhood, which
borders the development to the west and south, is composed primarily of Hispanics and
some whites. Some of the Hispanic youth in this area have formed the Mozart Park Gang
(see Map 6). Although not located in the immediate neighborhood, youth from Mission
Main also enter into rivalry with the youth from Bromley Heath.
The Neighborhood Surrounding the Development
Institutions in the immediate neighborhood surrounding Bromley Heath have
played an important role in shaping the relationships between the development and the
surrounding neighborhood. Recent residential and commercial development in the
neighborhood, in particular, have forced the development and neighborhood to address
drug-related issues.
Residential Uses
The proximity of residences along two sides of Bromley Heath have provided
these neighbors with an incentive to concern themselves with what occurs in and around
the development. The Jamaica Plain Neighborhood Development Corporation (NDC)
has developed 41 units of cooperative housing immediately abutting the development
along Centre Street, Walden Street, and Gay Head Street on what used to be vacant lots.
Modest homes surround the development along Heath Street.
Homeownership provides another incentive for neighborhood residents,
particularly those in the block group to the west of the development, to address drug
issues in and around the development. In this block group to the west, 812002, 42.8% of
occupied housing units were owner occupied in 1990. (Cambridge Systematics) In the
overall neighborhood, the percentage of homeowners was slightly lower than percentage
for the city of Boston in 1990, 24.2% vs. 28.1%, however (see Map 7). The percentage of
homeownership and the change in the number of housing units over the decade, however,
vary widely among the different block groups in the neighborhood as is shown in Table
4.1.
Table 4.1 Homeownership
Boston Tract to West of Tract to South of Tract to Southeast of
Development-- Development -- Development --
812002 1205001 1205003
% own occ % own % change % own % change % own % change
occ in occ in occ in
h units h units h units
1980-90 1980-90 1980-90
28.1% 42.8% 32.4% 14.1% -17.2% 21.1% 1.7%
(Source: 1990 Census)
Commercial Uses
Until recently, commercial uses have not played a significant role in drug-related
issues in and around the development. Retail businesses abut the development along
Centre Street. A number of these businesses are small Latino grocery stores (bodegas).
Most recently, a local developer, Mordi Levin of Boston Community Ventures has made
efforts to attract a mix of business uses in the immediate area. The recent development of
the Jamaica Plain Plaza has brought needed services to the neighborhood and increased
foot traffic in the area. Moreover, plans to develop a new supermarket on a vacant lot
next to the development should create a market incentive for the limited partnership of
Community Ventures, NDC, and TMC to address drugs and crime.
Transportation
The development is located next to the Jackson Square T-stop which produces a
constant flow of foot traffic along Centre Street past the development. The T-stop is a
mixed blessing. On the one hand, it increases the number of "eyes and ears" on the street
level adjacent to the, but at the same time it is located along a transportation route that
serves youths of rival gangs from Academy Homes and Mission Main. (Jacobs) The T-
stop also increases access to local drug markets in and around Bromley Heath. Residents
from the development and neighborhood, therefore, do not feel safe walking to the T-
stop, particularly at night. (Brown, p.54) Reluctance to use the T in this area creates
"homeboundness" and isolation among development residents. (Brown)
Other Uses
Finally, the Martha Elliot Health Center, located in the Bromley Heath
development, generates tensions with the surrounding neighborhood. Because the health
center serves mostly non-residents, Bromley Heath residents have difficulty getting
served. Each year, the health center treats 8,400 non-resident patients, many of whom are
Hispanics. (Brown) TMC Director Mildred Hailey cited this as an issue that needs to be
addressed, because Bromley Heath residents are being undeserved. Moreover, outsiders
come to use the facilities and leave, and so interaction between Bromley residents and the
outside does not improve.'" 9
Size and Design of the Development
The physical design of the buildings in Bromley Heath and the density and size of
the tenant population physically and socially isolate these tenants from neighborhood
residents. The physical design of Bromley Heath creates divisions even within the
Bromley Heath community. The development has three sections that were built during
different time periods and at different density levels (see Map 8). Heath Street was
constructed in 1940 and consists of 17 three-story walk-up buildings that constitute 420
units. Bromley Park was constructed in 1954 with 732 units in 10 seven- story elevator
building and 6 three-story walk-up buildings. Finally, Bickford Street, constructed in
1962 has 64 elderly, one bedroom units in a nine-story elevator building. (Brown, p.79)
The dense clustering of families in Bromley Park midrises most severely isolates
residents from the surrounding neighborhood. Many of these residents do not go out into
the neighborhood. (Brown, p. 59) At least two midrises attract a good deal of drug
dealing in apartments and hallways, which further isolates residents in their apartments.
In one of the midrises on Centre Street where a lot of dealing occurs, a steady stream of
buyers from outside the development moves in and out of the building at night.' 2 0 Few
people who actually lived in the building appeared to move about the hallways. The
119 Rodriguez, Gladys, Personal interview. 9 March, 1996.
12 Author's observations on police ride-along, 4 April, 1996.
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anonymity of the high-rise design combined with the building's location next to the
Jackson Square T-stop facilitates the drug situation there.
Demographic Characteristics -- the Development and Surrounding Neighborhood
Income Differences
In general, socioeconomic differences between residents of Bromley Heath and
the surrounding neighborhood vary widely. Median household income in the
development was $12,880 and $38,195 (1996) in the neighborhood surrounding the
development.m
Table 4.2 Median Household Incomes of Development and Neighborhood
Development Surrounding Boston (1996)
(1996) Neighborhood (1996)
Median Household Income $12,880 $38,195 $32,682
(Source: BHA MIS 1996 data and Cambridge Systematics)
Racial and Ethnic Differences
The Hyde Square neighborhood is extremely heteiogeneous; however, different
ethnic and racial groups are heavily concentrated in particular areas. Historically,
Bromley Heath has been almost all black, but some Hispanic families have moved into
the development during the last decade. In 1990, 73.9% of the development was black,
12.6% was white, and 34% was Hispanic.' 2 2 The surrounding neighborhood is
predominantly Hispanic, although whites are concentrated in certain areas. The two
block groups directly south of the development, 1205001 and 1205003, are 94.2% and
86.9% Hispanic, respectively (see Map 6). Many of these Hispanics are newly arrived --
the percentage of Hispanics in these two block groups increased 65.9% and 40.1 %
respectively, from 1980 to 1990. The block group directly to the west of the
development, 0812002, is quite racially and ethnically mixed -- 35.8% white, 25.4%
black, and 46.3% Hispanic. Hispanics probably represent a larger percentage of the
121 The surrounding neighborhood is defined according to Map 6. Although the boudoirs of this map differ
slightly from the neighborhood boundaries I have drawn according to gang activity, it is the most accurate
available income data to the comparison that I am making. (BHA MIS and Cambridge Systematics) The
income data differs in the Bromley Heath section, because the same data was not available for South Street
and Charlestown.
122 A large percentage of Hispanics in Bromley Heath are black.
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surrounding neighborhood population than the data reveal, because the Hispanic
population is under-reported. 123
Table 4.3 Racial and Ethnic Composition
Develop Block Block Block Block Block Census
ment group group group group group Map
812001 812003 812002 1205003 1205001 Totals
Race
White 1.6% 27.4% 3.5% 35.8% 39.2% 65.4% 51.3%
Black 76.3% 70.7% 75.9% 25.4% 23.2% 8.35 26.5%
Asian 0.1% 6.2% 0% 6.2% 0.7% 0% 2.3%
Other 32.6% 20.7% 32.6% 36.8% 26.3% 19.3%
Hispanic 22.0% 47.6% 25.7% 46.3% 86.9% 94.2% 39.9%
[Source: Bromley Heath TMC 1993 Demographics Report (qtd. in Brown) and 1990 Census]
The ways that these racial and ethnic differences affect the capacity of the
neighborhood and its organizations to deal with crime are complex. A few basic
observations, however, can be drawn. Race and ethnicity is more of a barrier among the
adult black, white, and Hispanic population. Communication between Blacks and
Hispanics has been poor at times, partly because many newly arrived Hispanics do not
speak English. Within the development, Hispanics are often withdrawn from the larger
population to a greater extent than blacks -- "let's put it this way, there is not a lot of
community leadership coming from the Latinos within the development.," 2 5 Among
Hispanic and African American youth, tensions exist, but these tensions appear to arise
more from battles over turf than as a result of race and ethnicity.126 Because sections of
the neighborhood are divided along racial and ethnic lines, youth gangs have formed
along these lines, which has exacerbated tensions between African Americans and
Hispanics. It should be borne in mind, however, that the most intense violence still
occurs between black youth from Bromley Heath and Academy Homes.
123 Jeffrey Sanchez of the Mayor's Office of Neighborhood Services estimated that the Hispanic population
in the Hyde Square / Jackson Square area was undercounted from 30 - 50 % in the 1990 Census. (Sanchez,
Jeffrey. Personal interview 22 February, 1996.)
124 Martinez, Claudio. Personal interview. 11 April, 1996.
125 ibid.
126 ibid.
Age Differences
The populations both in Bromley Heath and the surrounding neighborhood are
extremely young (see Table 4.4). This has been one of the key reasons that the area has a
significant number of youth gangs.
Table 4.4 Age Composition 27 _
Bromley Heath Hyde/Jackson Square Boston (1990)
(1996) Neighborhood (1995)
0-4 5% 7.2% 6.3%
6-14 19.4% 8.9% 9.8%
Under 20 40.% 25.6% 23.9%
(Source: BHA MIS data, 1996. Cambridge Systematics. 1990 Census)
2. History of Development/Neighborhood Relations
The Bromley Heath community has been both a major player in the larger
neighborhood, at the same time as it has remained an insular and separate. The TMC
management philosophy over the years has been that Bromley Heath residents will
collaborate with outside forces, including those of the surrounding neighborhood, as long
as the development's interests are advanced through such efforts.
During the 1960s, the surrounding neighborhood offered little help and support to
the Bromley Heath community. This sense of exclusion motivated a core group of
Bromley Heath activists to focus inward to build their internal organizing capacity.
According to Mildred Hailey:
in the beginning, Bromley Heath had to do things on its own because nobody from
the surrounding neighborhood was going to help. People from the outside looked
at Bromley Heath like it was a concrete jungle. 28
Bromley Heath tenants focused on self-reliance after Martin Luther King's assassination -
- "when all the looting and riots were going on in cities all over the country, the residents
of Bromley Heath mapped out a strategy to keep the community intact. 129 Residents
initially organized around public safety issues. Activists from the development began
127 1995 estimates were not available for the City of Boston.
128 Hailey, Mildred. Personal interview. 4 April, 1996.
129 ibid.
voluntary patrols and eventually secured funding to operate an independent police force
for Bromley Heath. These public safety efforts produced the seeds for establishing the
TMC.
The TMC developed direct links with federal, state and municipal institutions, and
this allowed Bromley Heath residents to dependent less on the surrounding neighborhood
for resources and develop in an insular way. TMC also has brought services to Bromley
Heath residents rather than send residents out to the surrounding community for services.
Historically, the TMC has been particularly successful at lobbying directly federal
agencies for security resources. At one point in the 1970s, the LEA funded 32 Bromley
Heath police officers. According to Milton Cole, who started volunteer patrols in the
1960s, "They liked us so much (LEA) that they would give us funding for more and more
officers through budget funds that were never used."13 0 The abundance of security
resources allowed Bromley Heath to remain to a large degree autonomous in their efforts
to fight drugs, and did not force the development to reach out to the surrounding
neighborhood.
The organizing capacity of the TMC has made the size and the largely
homogenous composition of the development an important source of political leverage
for Bromley Heath. Because of the Bromley Heath population's size, it has not needed to
rely on residents of the surrounding neighborhood to influence the political structure at
different levels. Also, the combination of size and organization has enabled Bromley
Heath to run larger programs and activities
At the same time as it developed as a distinct community, Bromley Heath also
emerged as an important player within the neighborhood. Through the history of
community organizing and confrontation, the TMC became a force with which the
surrounding neighborhood had to reckon. Hailey feels that the most important
achievement of Bromley Heath residents throughout the years has been to earn the respect
of the neighborhood, the city, and the nation. 3 1 The TMC has became a major player in
all neighborhood decisions: "Bromley Heath has always been involved in the
" Cole, Milton. Personal interview. 24 November, 1996.
Hailey.
neighborhood and demanded to be represented in all decisions in the neighborhood
because we are part of it." 3 2
More recently the TMC has begun to look outward toward the surrounding
neighborhood for collaborative strategies. Hailey stated, "we began to realize that we
were not an island unto ourselves, and we recognized the importance of collaborating
with whoever could help us."' 3 3 Collaborative efforts still remain a means to serve the
best interests of the Bromley Heath community, however. To this day, the TMC appears
to feel tension between protecting the Bromley Heath community and looking outward to
extend collaborative efforts.
The development has moved outward for resources, but it is difficult for
organizations from the neighborhood to enter into issues within the development. The
TMC deals on its own with what they perceive to be Bromley Heath issues. 34 Part of
this insularity stems from the TMC instinct to protect the development from negative
media coverage. The TMC has had "long drag out brawls with the Herald, the Globe, and
WBZ about how they report on public housing."' 35 Some Bromley Heath tenants feel
that the media has focused on the negative aspects -- crime, homicide, and drug dealing --
and ignored positive initiatives in the development.136 During one period, the TMC
severed all communication with the media.
Bromley Heath also has carried with it the stigma that labels most large public
housing developments, but to a lesser degree than other housing developments.137 Some
residents of the surrounding neighborhood have marked the area as forbidden territory.
One community activist who grew up near the development said that the stigma has
subsided somewhat over the last three years, but when she was growing up parents from
the neighborhood would say "don't ever go down around the project."138
132 Cole.
m3 Hailey.
134 McDonough, John. Personal interview. 16 April, 1996.
13 Cole.
6 ibid.
137 ibid.
138 Chacon, Karen. Personal interview. 11 April, 1996.
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The combination of Bromley Heath's inward approach to dealing with problems
and the stigma that the outside has associated with the development has created
substantial barriers between the development and surrounding neighborhood. These
differences notwithstanding, the development and the neighborhood have historically
collaborated at critical moments to protect the well-being of the larger neighborhood.
Bromley Heath residents have united forces with residents of the surrounding
neighborhood to block the siting of 1-95 through the neighborhood. The same players
also lobbied to site the Jackson Square T-stop in the neighborhood and insure that it was
depressed. Finally, the TMC has collaborated with neighborhood organizations on grant
proposals.
3. Dynamic of Drug Market
Gangs
The drug market in the larger neighborhood around Bromley Heath is a story of
gangs. The level and complexity of gang activity in and around the development mean
that neither Bromley Heath nor the neighborhood itself controls its destiny. The
surrounding neighborhood is composed of smaller subneighborhoods that have
significant gang and drug dealing activity and also feel impotent when they act alone to
address problems of crime and drug dealing.
The most intense and intractable gang warfare occurs between youth of Bromley
Heath and Academy Homes. This rivalry has been passed down from the adult men of
the previous generation. Tensions subside for a while and grisly incidents reopen old
wounds. One youth who lives with relatives in Bromley Heath, for instance, feels he
cannot visit his mother who lives across the street in Academy Homes.1 39
Some youth from Bromley Heath are involved in two other gang rivalries. About
three years ago an intense gang rivalry flared up between black youth from Bromley
Heath and Hispanic youth from Mozart Park, which abuts the development. Tensions
between these two groups have subsided, however, during the last three years. Second,
1 Thompson, Mary. Personal interview. 2 April, 1996.
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rivalry between some youth from Bromley Heath and Mission Main has produced the
most recent rash of violence around Gay Head and Walden Streets. (Gazette)
Type of Crime that Gangs Generate
The dense and complicated relations among the different gangs in the area
generate considerable random violence in and around the development. Because
boundaries between rival gangs shift frequently, shootings occur all over the development
and surrounding neighborhood without much predictability. Innocent bystanders are
frequently unintended victims of violence. One police officer referred to the intersection
of Walden and Minden Street at the corner of the development as a "shooting gallery." 4
The random violence that gang warfare generates has a profound potential to
ignite community organizing efforts in a way that planned and controlled violence does
not. Because random violence touches the lives of everyday people more frequently,
these types of crimes generate community outrage. Because of the intensity of gang
activity in and around Bromley Heath, residents and organizations in the neighborhood
eventually organize to confront drugs and violence. Unfortunately, these initiatives are
usually short-lived.
Degree of Resident Fear
Residents in the development and surrounding neighborhood are scared of
retaliation from drug dealers if they cooperate with police. Resident fear, however, is not
paralyzing for two reasons. First, community outrage at random violence often can
overcome individual fears. Second, enough residents are involved in Bromley Heath and
the surrounding neighborhood that attention can sometimes be deflected from individuals
who testify. Getting Bromley Heath residents to testify, however, has remained
extremely difficult. Sergeant Lawson of the Bromley Heath Police could recall only two
instances in the last six years when residents from the development testified in court.
Recognition of Crime and Drug Dealing
Residents and organizations from the surrounding neighborhood openly recognize
the gang and drug dealing problems within Bromley Heath and the neighborhood. The
"" Anonymous. Personal interview.
141 Lawson, James. Personal interview. 4 April, 1996.
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TMC, however, often has hesitated to recognize officially these types of problems to
avoid media attention and has tried to deal with violent incidents informally on its own.
These different approaches produce conflict between the TMC and neighborhood
organizations.
INSTITUTIONS AND RESPONSES
Strong institutional capacity to address drug-related problems exist both within
and outside of the development. Coordinating organizational energy from within and
outside of the development, however, has proven extremely difficult. The TMC
occasionally reaches out to the neighborhood, but it is difficult for the neighborhood to
penetrate the development.
1. Involvement and Institutional Capacity of Land Users in Neighborhood
The neighborhood surrounding Bromley Heath contains a number of competent
organizations with energetic youth leadership. Although the density of these
organizations insures conflict and overlap, there appears to be an underlying sense of
collaboration. Moreover, all groups in the larger neighborhood have some degree of
input in shaping the vision for the neighborhood.
Real Estate Development in the Immediate Neighborhood
Recent real estate development in the area has created a market incentive for the
developers to address issues of drugs in and around Bromley Heath. Boston Community
Ventures' development of JP Plaza has reduced the number of vacant lots around
Bromley Heath that fostered drug activity. Second, the presence of businesses has
increased pedestrian traffic, which some say has increased the perception of safety.
Third, the development process has initiated dialogue and participation among all
neighborhood groups to decide what use to dedicate vacant lots.
Plans for the development of the supermarket/health center have attracted the
attention and resources of the city and increased the neighborhood's leverage over
politicians. The city has begun to make overtures to improve safety in the neighborhood.
Also, commercial and residential real estate developers have forced the institutions of the
neighborhood to address drug problems in concert with Bromley Heath, whereas
previously Bromley Heath dealt with their own problems.
NDC
The physical proximity of the cooperative housing units to the development has
forced the NDC to move the TMC to address drug-related issues cooperatively. Crime
and the perception of crime along Walden and Minden Streets translates directly into loss
of revenues for NDC and ultimately threatens their existence. For instance, NDC was
unable to find a tenants for a home on Walden Street for 10 months because of the area's
dangerous reputation. The impact that drug problems have on NDC ventures creates a
strong incentive for NDC to continue struggling to generate initiatives with Bromley
Heath and other neighborhood organizations to address crime.
NDC also has helped address drug dealing through the neighborhood buildings
they choose for renovation. NDC tries to target drug dens in the neighborhood for
renovation. Moreover, NDC has been able to leverage City resources from Youth Build
in order to employ youth from the development and neighborhood to assist in the
renovation efforts.
Finally, residents who have contributed to NDC development of cooperative
housing units have developed an emotional attachment to preserving the well-being of the
neighborhood. At a candle-light vigil to address a drive-by shooting, a core group of
long-time neighborhood residents expressed how hard and long they had worked to
convert the vacant lots surrounding the development into decent housing and what this
meant to them. Tears welled up in the eyes of a former NDC worker who lives in the
neighborhood as she addressed the group in Spanish:
Each one of these houses is like one of my children. So, when I heard today that
stray bullets penetrated this family's home I felt profound anguish. I want to send
a message to everyone here and everyone in the neighborhood -- I beg you --
please do not move out. Stay and fight to save the neighborhood. Don't let a few
people destroy the work that so many of us have fought so hard to create.' 42
142 Gutierrez, Besaida. "Bromley Heath Candle Light Vigil. 22 March, 1996.
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The Hyde Square Task Force
The Hyde Square Task Force is a relatively new organization with young and
energetic leadership. Historically, the Hyde Square area has not been well organized or
connected with the political structure in Boston. The task force developed from a crime
watch that began around Mozart Street about eight years ago. Eventually, the task force
cohered around a feud that had developed between youth from the Mozart gang and the
Bromley Heath gang. Hispanic gang, the Mozart Boys and the Bromley Heat. Members
of the Hyde Square Task Force and the TMC convened meetings with youth from the
development and the neighborhood at the nearby elementary school. The task force also
organized an education collaborative between Bromley Heath and Hyde Square
neighborhood youth, which has helped break down barriers between the two groups.
Most energy for these initiatives has come from the Hyde Square Task Force.
Over the years, the Hyde Square Task Force concentrated heavily on developing
leadership skills among the very young youth 6-12, which has created a strong youth
leadership in the Hyde Square neighborhood. 143 Gang tensions between these two areas
have diminished also as a result.
The Hyde Square Task Force played a central role in initiating efforts to clean up
the Mozart Park playground and reduce drug dealing in the area. Youth from the
"Bromley Heat" and the Mozart gang used this playground for dealing, and because the
park runs along Centre Street, people walking to the Jackson Square T-stop felt unsafe.
According to Chris Hayes, Director of the BPD Crime Watch, "the good people from
Bromley Heath and the Hyde Square neighborhood were able to reduce the dealing in the
area and clean up the park. The younger Hispanics, blacks, and the older whites in the
neighborhood -- groups that have traditionally remained separate -- all came together in
this effort." 14 4 Clergy from the neighborhood, Mayor Menino, and Representatives
McDonough and Fitzgerald also were involved in these efforts.
1 Martinez.
1' Hayes, Chris. Personal interview. 3 April, 1996.
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Finally, The Hyde Square Task Force also has become more representative of the
neighborhood population and their needs, and they have paved stronger political inroads
with City Hall and state representatives. Mayor Menino has appointed a number of
Latino representatives from the neighborhood to his administration.
The Merchants' Association
Historically, the Merchants' Association neither has been involved nor
representative of neighborhood businesses and residents. Part of this arose because white
business owners from other parts of Jamaica Plain dominated the board of the
association. 145 Recently, more Latinos have been elected to the board, and consequently
the interests of Latino businesses have been represented more effectively. One of the
issues the new board has lobbied around has been securing more police foot patrol in the
area.
The Merchants' Association still faces daunting challenges, however. The new
supermarket poses strong challenges to bodegas in the area. Ownership of these stores
changes hands every year, in many cases, and bodega owners in the area are disorganized
and feud with one another. The energy to organize the bodega owners, however, has
come from the City rather than from the residents themselves.14 6
TMC and! Neighborhood Organizations
Most recently, a number of trends have forced the TMC and neighborhood
organizations to address issues together. There still, however, is a strong sense that
neighborhood organizations are not able to penetrate the Bromley Heath community. As
a result, there have been clashes between the TMC and the neighborhood organizations
on a number of issues. Ultimately, new business ventures in the area have forced the
TMC and neighborhood organizations to collaborate and have attracted enough city
attention to insure that this occurs.
1 Griffin, Sarah. Personal interview. 22 March, 1996.
146 Sanchez.
2. Involvement and Organizational Capacity of Tenants
Bromley Heath is unique among the three case studies in that there is a well
organized tenant group capable of bringing resources to bear on drug-related problems.
The internal organizational structure at Bromley Heath, the TMC, has direct political ties
with municipal, state, and federal agencies, which has allowed Bromley Heath to deal
with drug-problems. According to State Representative McDonough, whose district
formerly included Bromley Heath, "the TMC knows how to get what it wants." 4 7
Effect of Tenant Management on Relations with Neighborhood Institutions
The unique tenant management structure of Bromley Heath has helped integrate
the development with organizations of the surrounding neighborhood in some ways and
isolated it from the neighborhood in other ways. The capacity that the TMC has
demonstrated over the years to organize and access funds from a variety of sources has
created an incentive for neighborhood organizations to collaborate with the TMC. Long-
time TMC board member Milton Cole said "the neighborhood wants to include the
development in issues because the neighborhood knows that the people in Bromley Heath
are political movers." The TMC is represented on the board of the Hyde Square Task
and is included as a limited partner in the development of the new supermarket/health
center.
The TMC also has cooperated with neighborhood institutions in funding
collaboration efforts. The TMC understands the critical importance that collaboration
plays in securing funding from different foundations and government agencies. In 1995,
residents of Bromley Heath, Academy Homes I and II, the Hyde Square Area, and the
Egleston Square Area submitted jointly a proposal to the Boston Title V Delinquency
Prevention Program -- the "New Generations Collaborative," to address issues of youth
violence and bridge differences among gangs in the area. This collaborative has secured
$236,000 to provide programming and services to address the gang problems mentioned
earlier.
m4 McDonough.
148 Cole.
The TMC's ability to access directly funds for programmatic activity has
produced tensions with surrounding neighbors as well. Part of the intense, generation-
long rivalry between youths from Bromley Heath and Academy Homes has arisen
because Academy Homes youth have felt that they have no resources and programmatic
activity and Bromley Heath gets everything.149 TMC involvement as a limited partner in
the development of the supermarket/health center also has generated envy and conflict in
the neighborhood. Latino organizations in the neighborhood and in City Hall have
expressed concern that the supermarket threatens the existence of the large number of
bodegas in the neighborhood. At a more basic level, these organizations have underlined
the concern that Bromley Heath has been given an undue share of resources, whereas the
Latino community in the neighborhood has not.150
TMC / Tenant Relations
Tenant management makes resident involvement in drug-fighting issues a
particularly complicated path to navigate. Institutionally, resident management inevitably
has created tensions, suspicion, and accusations of favoritism among some residents.
Many residents therefore, appear to leave management to deal with public safety issues.
Moreover, in certain instances, Bromley police and the TMC differ appear to differ over
standards about who should and should not be arrested. Resident perceptions of
favoritism and nepotism in the TMC appears to create barriers to active participation of
some of the new Bromley Heath residents.
TMC/Neighborhood Tensions
Neighborhood organizations have experienced tensions with TMC in how to
address drug-related issues. A recent incident demonstrates how some of these tensions
play out among the TMC, Bromley Heath residents, and neighborhood organizations. On
March 20, 1996, stray gunfire from a drive-by shooting on Walden Street penetrated the
windows of a NDC cooperative housing unit abutting the development, barely missed a
young child inside the house. Neighborhood organizations arranged a candle-light vigil
to call community attention to the event, pressure public officials for a greater BPD
Thompson.
1"0 Sanchez.
presence in the area, and offer support for the victims. Representatives from all
neighborhood organizations attended the vigil as did a number of Bromley Heath
residents, State Representatives McDonough and Fitzgerald, and newspaper reporters.
The vigil helped pressure the BPD into assigning two full-time officers to Walden Street.
Despite these positive results, the vigil strained relations between the TMC and
some of the neighborhood organizations. The TMC was concerned about the effect the
vigil would have in the media. The TMC would have preferred to deal with this issue on
its own. These differences and tensions are knit into the fabric of relations between the
development and neighborhood; however, residents from both the development and
neighborhood attended the vigil and appear capable working through such differences.
A few trends have focused some of the TMC's organizing energy outward. The
recent influx of Hispanics into the development has increased the need for the Bromley
Heath TMC to network with the neighborhood organizations that represent a largely
Hispanic constituency.
One major gap in the organizing capacity of the development is the absence of a
young group of leaders. This issue will become more critical as the older leadership must
give way to younger leadership.
3. Effectiveness of Area Police Forces
The number of different police forces working the area around Bromley Heath
have divided areas, created artificial physical boundaries, and ultimately fragmented
efforts to address crime. Bromley Heath lies within a dense and complex network of
police forces. There are at least seven different police forces that operate in Bromley
Heath and the surrounding neighborhood. The TMC hires its own police force to patrol
the development, and the BPD Area E-5 police operate in the development and the
surrounding areas of Jamaica Plain. After the Bromley Heath officers get off duty at 3:00
a.m. every morning, a Boston Housing Authority Police (BHA) officer periodically
covers the development until 8:00 a.m.. The Jackson Square T-Stop is located between
Bromley Heath and Academy Homes, and therefore, the MBTA Police are in the middle
of the gang rivalries between the two developments and other areas of Boston. The
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Guardian Angels also patrol subway cars because different gangs operate near T-stops
along the Orange Line. Academy Homes hires their own private security company, and
the BPD Area B-2 police cover these two developments because they are in Roxbury.
This means that different BPD officers patrol Bromley Heath and Academy Homes.
Finally, the State Police patrol Parkland Avenue, which runs between Bromley Heath and
Academy Homes. All of these police forces operating in this small area carve up turf and
serve as a formidable obstacle to coordinating cooperative drug-fighting efforts between
the development and neighborhood.
Effect of the Bromley Heath Police
The Bromley Heath Police influence the way that crime affects
neighborhood/development relations in positive and negative manners. Bromley Heath
has five officers assigned to the development per shift -- the largest number of officers
assigned to any BHA development at one time. Although dealing certainly occurs in the
development, such strong police presence there displaces drug activity to the borders of
the development and into the surrounding neighborhood. This displacement has been a
critical stimulus for the NDC and other neighborhood organizations to initiate community
drug-fighting efforts.
Since Bromley Heath Police possess arrest powers only on the premises of the
development, they can do little to address criminal activity that moves outside of the
development and into the immediate neighborhood. As one Bromley Heath Officer said,
"my job is to get those guys out of Horn Way even though I know I'm just going to move
them out into Walden Street and Gay Head Street." 5 1 Bromley Heath Police have tried
to pressure the Area E-5 BPD to pick up drug activity once it is pushed from the
development into the neighborhood, but these efforts have met with only marginal
success.
Residents in NDC cooperatives directly abutting the development bear the brunt
of displaced drug dealing and crime. Youth from the development hang out on the front
steps of these co-ops across from the development along Walden Street, which generates
151 Lawson.
sharp tensions in the neighborhood."' The NDC, the TMC, and other groups that
compose the Hyde Square Task Force have met continually to diffuse these tensions and
address these issues. What once was a Bromley Heath issue has become very much an
NDC and Hyde Square neighborhood issue. The TMC and the Hyde Square Task Force
have tried to keep records and information on Bromley Heath youth who go into the
surrounding neighborhood to conduct illicit behavior. Because the NDC is a competent
organization and because resolution of this issue will determine the survival of these 41
properties, NDC is likely to continue forcing the development and neighborhood to
resolve drug issues in the area.
Bromley Heath Police have also worked well with Bromley Heath youth. Many
Bromley Heath youth have tipped off the police and adults when gang activity is going to
occur, and Bromley Heath Police have then secured the perimeter of the development in
order to keep out youth from Academy Homes. Although this temporarily diffuses
violent crime, Academy Homes youth perceive the Bromley Heath Police as protecting
youth from the development.15 3 In this sense, the Bromley Heath Police furthers the
image of the development as an insular place that deals with its own business.
4. Conclusion
Recent trends in the neighborhood have begun to spawn joint initiatives in the
development and neighborhood to address the wide-spread drug activity in the larger area.
The commercial and residential real estate in the immediate neighborhood of Bromley
Heath has given these developers and the City a strong incentives to see that the
neighborhood is safe enough for these ventures to succeed. Moreover, both within and
without the development a network of competent institutions exist. The key for the
neighborhood be how to combine resources in a coordinated way to address drug issues in
the area.
152 Griffin.
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CHAPTER 5: COMPARISON AND ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK
INTRODUCTION
Four elements in each of the three cases emerged as critical to understand how
drugs impact these larger communities and how capable they are to combat drugs and
related problems. These four elements are:
(1) the dynamics of the drug market;
(2) the involvement and institutional capacity of land users in the surrounding
neighborhood;
(3) the involvement and organizational capacity of public housing tenants; and
(4) the effectiveness of the police forces in the area.
These four elements provide a framework to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of
each development and surrounding neighborhood with regard to crime, as well as a
means of examining the dynamic among these four variables in each neighborhood. To
examine this dynamic, I first establish a continuum for each of the four variables in each
development. I then discuss how these variables relate to one another in each of the three
cases, and what these relationships say about what would have to be done to decrease
drug-related problems in each neighborhood.
1. The Dynamics of Drug Markets
The three cases illustrate a continuum of three kinds of drug markets and the type
of crime each produces. A monopolistic drug market in Charlestown bounds one end of
the continuum and a free market structure in the neighborhood containing Bromley Heath
anchors the other extreme. The drug market in and around South Street has fluctuated
between these two extremes, but has tended more toward monopoly (see Table 5.1). The
following section describes the content of these categories.
Table 5.1 Type of Drug Market
Monopoly Free Market
<---x--------------------------x------------------------------------------------------------------ >
Charlestown South Street Bromley Heath
South Street
Residents of the South Street development and surrounding neighborhood
primarily have dealt with small monopolistic drug organizations that periodically surface
in the development. Drug markets around South Street, regardless of kind, are much
smaller than those that envelop Charlestown and Bromley Heath. Since the power -
structure that has operated these smaller monopolies has been considerably weaker than
the Charlestown monopoly, residents of the South Street neighborhood have been able to
enforce a set of norms that render all types of crime, even crimes of disorder,
unacceptable. South Street neighborhood residents have felt more empowered than
neighborhood residents in Charlestown partly because smaller, sporadic monopolies are
less difficult and dangerous to break up than deeply entrenched ones.
Charlestown
In Charlestown, a small group of Townies has tightly controlled a hierarchical
drug dealing system in the development and larger neighborhood. Drug dealing is
rampant all over the development, however, the multiple dealers are located within a
hierarchically controlled organizational structure. Because the group at the top regulates
who does and does not deal drugs in and around the development, there is little turf
rivalry and consequently strictly controlled violence between drug dealers.
Residents of the surrounding neighborhood are safe from violence as long as they
mind their own business and remain silent about who is involved in crime and drug
dealing should they have facts. Moreover, the organizational structure is so controlled in
Charlestown that neighborhood residents who speak out against crime and dealing face
great risk of retribution. Residents both within and outside the development, therefore,
tolerate a good deal of property crime -- house breaks, car breaks, etc. -- as a reasonable
alternative to taking on the organized crime structure. In summary, a monopolistic drug
dealing structure produces little random violence and a culture of silence and withdrawal.
Bromley Heath
At the other end of the continuum, a free market drug dealing structure generating
random violence exists in and around Bromley Heath. A dense and complicated network
of gangs operates in the larger neighborhood, and since boundaries between rival gangs
shift frequently, shootings occur all over the development and surrounding neighborhood
without much predictability. Stray bullets frequently touch innocent bystanders, and such
random violence often generates community outrage and organizing -- the opposite effect
that violence produces in Charlestown. Unfortunately, community organizing efforts
around random violence are usually short-lived.
The relationships among gangs, drug dealing, and violence in and around Bromley
Heath are difficult to sort out. Although gangs do appear to revolve around the economic
profits of drug dealing, the violence that gang activity produces is not all a product of
market competition for drug turf. A good deal of violence also arises from social and
personal vendettas between gangs. For example, youth from Bromley Heath and
Academy Homes have killed over romantic escapades and for the sake of tradition.
Efforts to break up gang rivalries, then, also must deal with the social aspects of these
organizations. In either case, drugs and social rivalry are mutually reinforcing.
2. Institutional Capacity of Space in Surrounding Neighborhood
The involvement and institutional capacity of users who operate land surrounding
public housing and their links to neighborhood, city, and state organizations have a
profound impact on crime in and around the development. These three cases sketch out a
continuum around the institutional capacity of land users surrounding these
developments. At the negative end of the spectrum, individuals and institutions operating
land around the Charlestown development have proven incapable of resolving drug
dealing problems in and around the development. At the positive end of the spectrum,
individuals and institutions in neighborhoods surrounding Bromley Heath and South
Street have been more successful in addressing drug issues.
Table 5.2 Institutional Capacity of Surrounding Neighborhood
Poor Institutional Capacity Strong Institutional Capacity
<-----x-------------------------------------x--- ---------------- >
Charlestown Bromley Heath South Street
Institutional Capacity in Surrounding Neighborhood'54
The institutional capacity in the neighborhood surrounding the Charlestown is
anemic and the community fabric is badly frayed. The development is girdled
immediately by deeply troubled institutions and more broadly by individuals and
organizations that are not linked to the political system in ways that bring resources to
bear on problems of the development. 55
The siting of Charlestown High School next to the Bunker Hill Development
creates difficulties from many standpoints. First, the dense concentration of adolescents
who study in one of Boston's most troubled public schools next to a vast maze of
unsupervised buildings has made the development a refuge for illicit behavior. The two
institutions that operate the high school and the development, Boston Public Schools and
the Boston Housing Authority (BHA), are large, city bureaucracies that have proven
incapable of addressing local problems. Moreover, Charles Newtown, which abuts the
development on Medford Street, is viewed by the rest of Charlestown as an extension of
the project, which only deepens the concentration of drugs and crime in the area.
In contrast to Newtown, the infill of cooperative housing that the NDC has built
immediately abutting Bromley Heath shows the positive influence on crime of a
surrounding institutional use along the borders of a development. Because NDC
cooperative housing is so physically close to the development, crime that spills from the
development strongly impacts residents of these cooperatives and has forced the NDC to
address these issues with the TMC and other neighborhood institutions. NDC and Boston
Community Ventures, the principal developer of the supermarket, are concerned about
crime in and around Bromley Heath, because the success of their venture is inextricably
tied to the level of crime in the area. When the lots containing NDC housing were
vacant, and the NDC did not operate in the immediate neighborhood, there was less
impetus for neighborhood institutions to confront crime along the borders of the
development.
154 1 have not divided by development the following discussion of the surrounding neighborhood
institutional capacity because it would break up the flow of comparison.
155 St. Catherine's Church, located next to development along Tufts Street, is an exception to this claim.
The church provides a number of valuable social services to development tenants.
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A small, competent organization, NDC has been far more capable of addressing
the concerns of its tenants and moving other institutions to confront crime than Boston
Public Schools or the BHA have been in and around the Charlestown development. In
addition, the NDC and the Bromley Heath TMC both have long-term mutual interests in
other projects, such as the development of the supermarket, and therefore, these groups
have greater incentive to cooperate. Administrators of Charlestown High School and
BHA managers, on the other hand, come and go and have no long-term commitment to
each other. Within the BHA and Charlestown High School there are individuals who
have worked together to address high school student drug use in BHA hallways; however,
difficulty establishing horizontal lines of responsibility across these two vertical
organizations has neutralized individual efforts extremely.
Residential real estate development in areas surrounding the Charlestown
development has not produced the same institutional impetus to address crime that it has
in and around Bromley Heath. Real estate agencies that operate in upper-income
residential areas near the Charlestown development have fundamentally different goals
and approaches than the NDC. Because Charlestown real estate agencies want to attract
the highest-income buyers and renters, they have denied that drugs and crime are a
problem in Charlestown. They fear that such recognition would scare off potential
customers. NDC, on the other hand, is a not-for-profit agency that also has assumed the
mandate of confronting problems affecting the community.
The institutional capacity of the neighborhood surrounding South Street must not
be viewed strictly as the institutions physically located in the neighborhood, but as the
capacity of individual neighborhood residents to move outside organizations to act on
drugs in the development. Since the neighborhood surrounding South Street is mostly
residential, individuals rather than institutions in the immediate neighborhood provide the
link to other municipal and state institutions.
Residents of the South Street neighborhood have been involved in crime issues in
the development for three reasons. (1) Homeowners have a strong financial incentive to
resolve crime to protect their property values. Flight of homeowners from the area during
the last 10 years has destabilized the neighborhood, and the future of the remaining
homeowners will determine whether the neighborhood declines. Should the
neighborhood fall apart, homeowners stand to lose a lot of money. Conversely, the strong
demand for property in Charlestown because of its proximity to downtown Boston
insulates property values from negative effects of crime. (2) The physical proximity of
the South Street development to neighborhood residents means that they personally feel
the impact of crime that spills out of the development and forces them to address the
issue. (3) Drugs provide an outlet for the long activist tradition in Jamaica Plain of which
many neighborhood residents are a part.
Residents of the South Street neighborhood have been the most effective of the
three neighborhoods in organizing and working the political system to bring resources to
bear on drugs in the development. First, individuals with the most political clout --
activist homeowners -- have advocated on behalf of South Street tenants. Second, this
core group of activists and city and state political aides who live in the neighborhood
have been masters at linking organizations horizontally at the neighborhood level and
vertically through the city and state political levels. The third reason neighborhood
organizations have successfully addressed drug-related problems is that they have
mustered enough clout to tackle the most difficult issues, such as breaking up drug rings
and evicting drug dealers from the development. Admittedly, the most difficult drug
problems in South Street pale in comparison to those of Charlestown and Bromley Heath.
Conversely, residents with political clout in the neighborhood surrounding the
Charlestown development have isolated themselves from neighborhood organizations and
issues concerning the development. First, part of this isolation arises from the physical
separation of the development from upper-income residential areas. The second part of
the isolation arises from sharp racial and class differences between upper-income areas
and the project. Such differences are nowhere near as pronounced in the neighborhoods
that contain South Street and Bromley Heath. Class tensions with working-class Townies
who dominate neighborhood organizations also have contributed to upper-income
newcomers' detachment from such organizations. Third, Charlestown serves as a
bedroom community for upper-income residents who work in downtown Boston, which
means that these residents have little interest participating in civic life, particularly a civic
life in the development that does not touch them directly. Fourth, since many upper-
income new arrivals have no children or their children study outside of the neighborhood,
they have little incentive to insure a minimum quality of life standard in the rest of
Charlestown. Fifth, there appears to be a culture in Charlestown that discourages
newcomers from "making waves."
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Upper-income resident withdrawal has devastated the capacity of neighborhood
institutions to confront crime in and around the development. Since these residents have
not lent their political leverage to neighborhood organizations, these organizations have
remained the domain of the Townies with little political clout over the city. Townie
threats to abandon the neighborhood do not hit the city with the same force as those of
South Street neighbors, because higher-income residents most likely would replace
Townies and lower-income residents would replace South Street homeowners. From the
city's perspective, its badly depleted tax base would grow should Townies continue their
exodus, whereas continued homeowner flight from the South Street neighborhood would
send that neighborhood into a spiral of further decline and depletion of the city tax base.
Townies do not effectively utilize the political clout they do have. A culture of
rivalry and competition has produced a proliferation of neighborhood organizations
whose purposes overlap and whose already limited political power is dispersed. This
dispersal of power makes it difficult for neighborhood organizations to amass the kind of
support necessary to move city bureaucracies. Furthermore, the Code of Silence has
induced neighborhood organizations to avoid the most difficult drug-dealing issues and
focus on preventative approaches to the drug problem. Neighborhood organizations in
Charlestown, then, have been impotent against drug dealing in and around-the
development.
Residents of the neighborhood surrounding Bromley Heath have little
involvement in drug issues of the development, but for different reasons than
15 Brattley, Carrol. Telephone interview. Feb. 15, 1996.
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neighborhood newcomers to Charlestown. The TMC in Bromley Heath has not
welcomed neighborhood institutions to help address drugs in the development. TMC
historically has opted to "deal with their own problems."' 57 Consequently, residents from
the surrounding neighborhood have had difficulty paving inroads with the TMC to jointly
address crime problems.
Over the last eight years in the Hyde Square/Jackson Square neighborhood,
residents have developed their organizational capacity; however, participation remains
erratic. The leadership of the Hyde Square Task Force and the Merchants' Association
has become more representative of neighborhood needs and has improved vertical
connections with City Hall. These positive strides, in addition to increased political
leverage over the city from recent commercial and residential development in the area,
have bolstered the neighborhood's claim on city resources, particularly police resources.
Neighborhood residents and organizations have had difficulty creating bridges
with the TMC to best leverage neighborhood and development resources against crime.
The obstacle to cooperative development/neighborhood efforts, however, has stemmed
mostly from within the development, whereas in Charlestown most of these obstacles
have arisen from dynamics in the surrounding neighborhood. Ultimately, however,
neighborhood groups and the TMC usually put aside differences when opportunities for
joint gains arise, such as collaboration on youth grants, the development of the
supermarket, and chances to increased police resources in the area.
3. Involvement and Organization of Public Housing Tenants
A common theme that surfaced in all three cases was the difficulty of engaging
public housing tenants in drug-fighting initiatives. An engaged tenant organization is
essential to successful community drug-fighting efforts in and around public housing,
because tenants have the kind of front-line information that police need to take effective
action. All three tenant populations face the following challenges to active involvement
with drug issues:
(1) fear of reprisal from drug dealers,
15 Tanner, Joyce. Personal interview. March 9, 1996.
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(2) conflict of interest from family involvement in the drug trade,
(3) general tenant apathy, and
(4) division among residents
The extent to which these barriers exist differs in each of the three developments, as does
tenant capacity to overcome such obstacles. Some factors that determine whether
residents can overcome such obstacles are:
(1) tenant relations with management
(2) the size of the development,
(3) tenant relations with police.
None of the three public housing populations represents a best case scenario in which
tenants refuse to tolerate drug activity and communicate directly with police and
management about illicit behavior. Given a sub-optimal continuum, Charlestown
provides a convincing case for a worst case scenario of tenant involvement.
Table 5.3 Public Housing Tenant Capacity
Weak Tenant Capacity Strong Tenant Capacity
< x--------x -------------------------  ------x ------------- >
Charlestown South Street Bromley Heath
South Street
An involved tenant population in the South Street development has been the
missing ingredient in an otherwise potent drug-fighting effort. Usually at least one tenant
from within the development has participated in organizing efforts, but generally South
Street tenants also have been apathetic and reluctant to face crime. Fear of reprisal from
drug dealers, family involvement in the drug trade, general tenant apathy, and division
among residents, all present difficult challenges to tenant involvement, however, to no
where near the extent as in Charlestown.
Good tenant/management relations as well as the small size of the development
mitigate to some degree the negative effect of limited tenant involvement and
organizational capacity. Moreover, tenants do have some lines of communication with
police. Although residents ultimately will not testify against drug dealers from the
development, they have provided police with consistent information about principal
offenders. In short, what has kept the development afloat has been the ability of one or
two development residents to work effectively with activists from the surrounding
neighborhood.
Charlestown
Bunker Hill tenants face the same barriers to involvement as South Street tenants,
only to a much larger degree. Bunker Hill tenants have disconnected themselves entirely
from efforts to address drug dealing and crime. Punishment for informing in Charlestown
is so swift and definitive that few residents risk communicating with police officers.
Also, there are rumors that some tenant task force members have relatives who have been
involved at one time in the drug trade. Furthermore, the drug market is so all-
encompassing of the development that a number of tenants are involved in drug use or
distribution. Moreover, the long history of racial tensions within the development has
further divided the development.
Unlike South Street, however, tenant/management relations and the size of the
Bunker Hill population exacerbate rather than mitigate severely limited tenant willingness
to address drugs. Bunker Hill tenants and management have a history of tension and
distrust, and consequently have been unable formulate and advance a vision about how to
take on the rampant drug dealing problem. Since tenants have failed to organize and
utilize the potential political clout of their large numbers, size only means that the scale of
drug dealing problems is larger and neighborhood organizations feel further paralyzed to
address these problems. Size, then, only helps isolate development tenants from
neighborhood institutions and residents. A history of poor to non-existent tenant/police
communication further incapacitates the community to address the drug problem. Strong
barriers to tenant involvement and limited organizational capacity, mean that Bunker Hill
tenants are impotent to address drug issues.
Bromley Heath
Tenants of Bromley Heath face the four barriers to tenant involvement to a greater
extent than South Street residents and to a lesser degree than Charlestown tenants.
Although Bromley Heath tenants fear reprisal from drug dealers, the revenge often is not
as definitive as it is in Charlestown, because the drug organizations are less organized
around Bromley Heath. Family involvement in the drug trade, general tenant apathy, and
division among residents all present substantial barriers, however.
Tenant management makes Bromley Heath the only development of the three with
a strong tenant organization. This has been a mixed blessing. On the positive side, the
TMC has provided for residents' needs on their own by accessing resources directly from
federal agencies. Also, TMC has been a force with which neighborhood institutions
around Bromley Heath have had to reckon and has had an unprecedented say in
neighborhood decisions for a public housing development.
Second, strong tenant organization also has made the size of the tenant population
an advantage. Because the TMC is organized and aggressively pursues grants, the tenant
population size often increases the amount of grant funds. Although the size of the
development certainly isolates the development from the neighborhood, it also has given
the TMC leverage at the bargaining table with all levels of outside agencies.
Tenant management also creates disadvantages to crime-fighting efforts. The
TMC's greatest strength -- its organizational capacity -- has fostered a critical weakness --
its inward approach to problems. The TMC's motivation to organize is based on a
tradition of self-reliance and determination to get what it needs on its own. This tradition
of self-reliance has produced a self-imposed isolation from neighborhood organizations.
Consequently, the TMC prefers to deal with drug and crime issues internally, which
separates Bromley Heath residents from the neighborhood and makes cooperative
development/neighborhood drug-fighting strategies difficult to initiate. Although the
TMC has made some strides in networking with neighborhood organizations, it has not
taken full advantage of resources in the area.
4. Effectiveness of Police Forces
Three factors determine how police deal with crime and drug dealing around
public housing developments:
(1) The most important factor is the extent to which police positively interact with
residents.
(2) The complexity of police institutional networks and the degree of
communication among different departments determine how effectively different
police forces can coordinate efforts to address crime in the area.
(3) A second factor is the intensity of police coverage in the development and
neighborhood.
Along a continuum around these three factors South Street is near the positive end and
Bromley Heath and Charlestown fall nearer to the negative extreme.
Table 5.4 Effectiveness of Police Forces in the Area
Ineffective Effective
<------x-----------------x--------------------x --------------------- >
Charlestown Bromley Heath South Street
South Street
In terms of the neighborhood as a whole, South Street residents from the
neighborhood and development have the most effective relationship with police officers.
Basically only two police forces operate in and around the development -- the BPD and
the BHA police. This relatively simple policing environment helps insure that the same
officers patrol the area which is critical to fostering positive resident/police relations. By
and large, residents provide the same officers with consistent information, and the police
respond to resident concerns, although this is more a characterization of the neighborhood
resident/police relationship. The real challenge the South Street neighborhood faces is
scarcity of police resources.
Charlestown
The Charlestown development and surrounding neighborhood suffer problems in
all three areas of policing. First, resident/police communication represents a worse case
scenario both within and outside the development, largely because of the Code of Silence.
Second, the complex institutional policing environment in and around the development
further exacerbates poor resident/police communication. At least six different police
forces operate in and around the Charlestown development -- the FBI, the State Police,
the BPD, the BMP, the BHA Police, and Charles Newtown security. Rivalries persist
among these different police forces and communication and coordination is poor to non-
existent. Moreover, the uncoordinated police forces operating in and around the
development have helped generate an overall suspicion of police and made it difficult for
any of the police forces, particularly the BHA police, to make inroads with Charlestown
residents. Finally, although a plethora of police forces operate in the area, the
development does not receive sufficient or consistent police coverage. During the
afternoon shift, the BHA assigns one lone officer to cover the development and no one is
on duty on the 12 p.m. to 8 a.m. shift. Consequently, when dusk falls, the development
becomes a playground for drug dealers.
Bromley Heath
The policing environment in and around Bromley Heath has a number of
advantages and disadvantages. First, individual police forces have established channels
of communication with their respective resident populations, in most instances. Little
effective communication exists across the vertical lines that connect residents to their
particular police forces, however. For instance, the BPD is not involved in Bromley
Heath issues, and the Bromley Heath police do not have the legal powers to address drug-
related issues in the surrounding neighborhood. Second, the main obstacle to effective
policing in and around Bromley Heath is coordinating the numerous police forces that
patrol the neighborhood. At least eight different police forces operate in and around the
development which necessitates enormous feats of coordination to address specific
problems. Communication across boundaries and police departments, therefore,
frequently breaks down, and consequently, police forces help carve up and fragment
different communities within the larger area.
Third, Bromley Heath clearly has stronger police coverage than the other two
developments. Strong police presence in Bromley Heath pushes some drug dealing and
crime outside of the development forcing the surrounding neighborhood to deal with
these problems. On the negative side, the Bromley Heath police have bounded the
development off from the surrounding neighborhood. This isolation makes it more
difficult for capable neighborhood institutions to address crime issues jointly with the
development, and creates an "us vs. them" mentality.
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DYNAMICS ACROSS VARIABLES
Thus far, I have compared the three cases across four variables (see Table 5.5).
This comparison helps indicate where particular strengths and weaknesses lie in each
neighborhood's capacity to deal with its crime and drug dealing problem. Now I shall
examine the dynamic and interplay among these strengths and weaknesses in each case.
Table 5.5 Comparison of the Four Variables Among Developments
South Street Charlestown Bromley Heath
Drug Market Small Monopoly Large Monopoly Free Market
Institutional Good Poor Good
Capacity in
Neighborhood
Tenant Capacity Poor Poor Good
Effectiveness of Good Poor Fair
Police
South Street
The dynamic across the four variables in South Street produces an effective but
precarious overall drug-fighting strategy. Positive synergies among three variables -- the
drug market, the institutional capacity of the surrounding neighborhood, and the
effectiveness of police -- have made it possible to contain drug problems in the area with
extremely limited public housing tenants participation.
A competent group of individual activists from the surrounding neighborhood
have mobilized effectively external institutions to focus relentlessly on a small
monopolistic drug market. The physical proximity of neighborhood residents to the
development and the small scale of the drug market have also allowed neighborhood
residents to keep close tabs on drug dealers for police, and thus, compensate for what has
been at times a withdrawn and taciturn tenant population. The physical proximity of
neighborhood residents to such a small development tenant population have also allowed
neighborhood residents to know personally all youth in the development, which has
served an effective preventative function.
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The institutional simplicity of the policing environment in the area also has
created positive synergies among variables. The small size of the tenant population
combined with police coverage from the same officers has allowed police to establish
good individual relationships with tenants and understand safety issues at a detailed level.
Regardless of how strong a dynamic a neighborhood has with respect to these
three variables, a minimal degree of participation and energy from within the
development is necessary. Recently, the minimal baseline of tenant participation has
worn dangerously thin and threatens the hard-fought achievements of the neighborhood.
Individual activists around South Street have been unable to institutionalize a group of
residents from the development and the neighborhood to dedicate itself to addressing
crime in the neighborhood. Drug-fighting efforts continue to be reactive, ad hoc, and
dependent on the extraordinary dedication and commitment of a core group of
neighborhood activists. This leaves the positive dynamic among neighborhood activists,
the police, and the drug market extremely vulnerable. Should the strength of individual
neighborhood activists falter or the limited participation of development tenants
extinguish, the neighborhood is likely to degenerate rapidly.
Charlestown
Taken as a whole, the dynamic across the four variables creates a number of
negative synergies that result in overwhelming drug-related problems in the Charlestown
development. Underlying these negative dynamics is a badly torn social fabric within and
between development and neighborhood. Upper-income residents with little interest in
local civic issues have replaced many working-class Townies from the neighborhood who
had been intimately involved in community affairs. A poor minority population fearful of
entering civic life because of the long and violent history of racism in Charlestown has
replaced working-class residents from the development. Townies who do remain feel
threatened from above and below, and they tend to dominate neighborhood institutions.
These disturbing class and racial relationships leave little institutional capacity in the
development and surrounding neighborhood to reverse the troubling dynamics around
drugs in the development.
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The large monopolistic drug market in Charlestown generates destructive
synergies with withdrawn development tenants and upper-income neighbors,
impoverished neighborhood institutions, and ineffective police forces. First, Charlestown
High School magnifies the drug problem in and around the development. Second, the
scale and type of drug market also has facilitated the retreat of surrounding neighbors
with financial and political clout from issues regarding the development. Because the
monopolistic drug market concentrates drugs in the development and produces violence
that does not touch directly residents of the surrounding neighborhood, they have little
incentive to address such issues. Third, the drug market really has taken its toll on
development tenants. The broad reach of the drug market has created a large amount of
substance dependency among development tenants. Furthermore, the code of silence
discourages resident organizing around crime and severs communication between police
and tenants. Confronted with these negative and self-reinforcing dynamics, it is little
wonder that neighborhood organizations of limited political clout have been impotent in
reducing drugs in and around the development.
The policing environment also has reinforced the intractability of the drug
problems in the area. The paucity of police coverage in the development has made the
place a haven for drug dealing. Moreover, the undercover policing style of multiple
police agencies has fed resident suspicion and withdrawal from police and from each
other.
Charlestown, then, suffers serious problems on all four fronts important to drug
fighting efforts, and the litany of negative synergies this produces goes on and on. Given
the depth of these problems in Charlestown, and the negative effect these problems
produce together, the cycle will be difficult to untangle.
Bromley Heath
The dynamic among the four variables in and around Bromley Heath create
advantages and disadvantages to drug fighting strategies. Most important, however, the
synergy between displacement of drugs and related problems into surrounding areas
operated by institutions with vested market interests translates into a will and capacity to
address these problems.
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The strong organizational capacity of the TMC and the presence of the Bromley
Heath Police have created both positive and negative dynamics between the development
and the neighborhood. On the positive side, the Bromley Heath Police have forced
competent institutions in the neighborhood to address crime displaced from the
development. Moreover, the involvement of such institutions has been contagious. After
institutions like the NDC and the Hyde Square Task Force have initiated organizing
efforts around crime, neighborhood and Bromley Heath tenants have begun to join these
efforts.
On the negative side, the combination of TMC management and Bromley Heath
policing produces an inward focus on crime in the development that frequently precludes
overtures from neighborhood organizations to confront issues in a coordinated fashion.
The complexity of the institutional policing environment in the area works against
addressing the free market dealing structure in a coordinated fashion. The numerous
police forces in the area have helped create turf boundaries between rival groups in the
area. Also, police forces understandably have had difficulty coordinating different police
agencies to address crimes that occur on borders of police jurisdictions.
The proliferation of gangs in the area means that TMC and Bromley Heath Police
have limited control over the larger drug dealing situation in their midst and makes it
difficult for them to deal with these problems on their own. These parallel and disjoined
efforts of the development and neighborhood, then, are an ineffective strategy to combat
the free market drug dealing structure in the area.
Conclusion
Wide differences among the three developments and surrounding neighborhoods
require that strategists understand the strengths and weakness of the most important
factors that bear on the drug dealing and crime in these neighborhoods. Strategists also
must understand how these variables relate to create an overall dynamic in order to design
strategic interventions.
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CHAPTER 6 -- STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
In this final section, I discuss what the framework I have developed in the
previous section implies about how the BHA as an institution should rethink its role in
drug-fighting efforts. Then I speculate about what strategic interventions the BHA could
employ to improve the respective drug situations in and around the three developments
under study.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BHA
The BHA neither has the manpower nor the institutional capacity to eliminate
drugs from its developments. Drugs and related problems always will beset BHA
developments. Given the magnitude of drug-related problems and the scarce public
housing authority resources, the objective of the BHA needs to become how to harness all
available resources in the most effective way to marginally impact drugs in and around its
properties. This task over-simplifies the institutional environment in which the BHA
operates and removes drug-fighting efforts from difficult political realities, but it remains
a sound organizing principle for the agency.
One reason I looked at the development/neighborhood dynamic was to determine
the extent to which drug-fighting resources in the neighborhood could augment
development resources. The BHA's hierarchical structure often encourages its employees
to adopt a tunnel vision that ignores important resources outside the agency's vertical
lines. The South Street and Bromley Heath case studies demonstrate the powerful
resources that individuals and institutions in the surrounding neighborhoods offer the
developments. These two case studies suggest that management at BHA developments
needs to undertake a rigorous analysis of the dynamics in the larger neighborhood to find
out what additional resources or problems it has with respect to drugs. Chapter 5
provides a framework that site managers can employ to understand the relationship of the
development/neighborhood dynamic to drug problems. Neighborhood/development
analysis, however, would only constitute one component of a larger BHA central office
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strategy to understand drug problems in its developments and to best utilize its resources.
The BHA needs to conduct the same analysis in other areas that impact on drug problems,
such as drug treatment and prevention.
In order to develop and implement a strategy that considers the dynamic produced
by the four factors that impact drugs at the development level, the BHA needs to
undertake changes at the central office and development levels as well as develop links
between the two. The BHA has made important organizational strides in this direction,
but work remains.
Central Office Changes
To recognize and respond to drug problems at the development/neighborhood
level, the BHA needs to initiate organizational changes at the central office level. Drug-
fighting strategies need to cut across departmental lines of the central office. The BHA
has begun broader institutional efforts breakdown rigid departmental lines and central
office/development division through a new system that organizes developments into
clusters of three and assigns development and central office level staff to plan operational
issues of those developments. Changes need to occur, however, to join more directly the
different central office departments involved in public safety issues.
Sharp organizational barriers exist between Public Safety and the Community
Initiatives Department (CID), the two central-office departments most directly involved
in drug-fighting efforts. Both departments are funded through HUD's Public Housing
Drug Elimination Program (PHDEP). Currently, the energies of the two departments are
moving in opposite directions. Although change is occurring, the Public Safety
department still maintains its focus on hardware approaches that most highly value
making arrests, and the community initiatives department concentrates on resident
organizing, drug treatment, and drug prevention. These two worlds rarely meet, and there
is little thought given to how the different drug-fighting approaches of these two
departments could be self-reinforcing at the local level. Operating in isolation, the efforts
of the public safety and community initiatives departments ignore the complex dynamic
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that exists in and around developments and consequently render much weaker overall
results.
There has been little thinking about under which circumstances preventative,
software approaches could reinforce hardware approaches and vice versa. For instance,
the public safety department and CID need to consider which developments have the
largest population of 7-13 year olds when developing their drug-fighting strategies and
deciding what kinds of policing approaches to employ. A large percentage of 7-13 year
olds in a development implies a preventative policing approach that involves
conferencing with youth, parents, and managers, recreational activities and mentoring
programs. CID drug prevention programs would reinforce this type of policing approach.
Coordination of hardware and software approaches are especially necessary after the
police manage to dislodge an entrenched drug dealing structure in a development. A
continued police presence is required, however, there must be aggressive outreach efforts
to youth to prevent them from filling the new drug-dealing vacuum. The timing and
coordination of such approaches is critical, and currently, little planning of this type
exists.
Disjointed efforts between public safety and community initiatives need to be
reversed, and the energy of both departments must be coordinated and channeled against
drug-related problems at the development level. The BHA needs to undertake structural
changes at the central office to facilitate the change. There needs to be a person in the
central office responsible for coordinating the activities of the public safety and
community initiatives departments. This job could charge the individual with managing
the BHA's Public Housing Drug Elimination Program Grant that funds both of these
departments. HUD requires that grantees implement a multifaceted drug-fighting strategy
that coordinates different hardware and software approaches. The directors of the
community initiatives and the public safety departments would report to this "facilitator"
on progress toward coordinating drug-fighting strategies according to the terms of the
grant application. Given the tensions between these two departments, however, it is
critical that this position remain independent of these two departments.
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Development-level Changes
The BHA also needs to change the way it does business at the development level.
The three case studies show how different the dynamics of the drug market and
development/neighborhood relations are in each place. These differences require distinct
interventions. The development manager is in the best position to understand the
dynamics among the four major factors that impact drugs and development/neighborhood
relations. Moreover, the manager is the actor that can best link the development-level
agents of the public safety and community initiatives departments -- police officers and
youth workers -- and coordinate other local players.
The BHA is trying to place the manager at the forefront of the public safety
agenda by decentralizing operations through the cluster structure and initiating regular
development public safety meetings. Public safety meetings were first organized to
establish communication between management and police officers. Subsequent rounds of
meetings attempted to bring youth workers into the loop. Managers have begun to
communicate effectively with police officers, but they have not been able to facilitate
interchange between police and youth workers. Communication between these two
positions is difficult to establish because interests of youth workers and police often are at
direct odds. Many officers still measure job success as the number of arrests they make.
Youth workers, on the other hand, are often placed in the position of trying to keep youth
out of trouble. Some youth workers also fear reprisal from hard core gang members
should they communicate with police. These conflicting interests create substantial and
real barriers to effective police/youth worker communication. Although youth workers
have the most grounded information about who is involved in drugs, these barriers may
necessitate that youth workers play a reinforcement rather than a central role in drug-
fighting efforts.
Managers also need to become involved in resident capacity-building initiatives in
order to develop relations of mutual trust with residents. Management/resident "shared
vision" is essential to drug-fighting efforts at the local level. (Keyes, Strategies and
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Saints) CID currently is charged with resident capacity building initiatives. The central
office needs to institutionalize a way to weave management into this capacity building
process. Currently, tenants have not been introduced into the public safety meetings, but
when they are, it will be essential that management and residents work together.
Management also will play a critical role in facilitating effective relations between
officers and residents. Ultimately, the manager will be the point person for coordinating
the youth worker, the police officer and the tenant task force to address safety efforts.
To round out the manager's role in the four point framework I have
recommended, the manager also needs to consider the resources and drug problems in the
surrounding neighborhood and decide whether it is worthwhile to involve actors from the
surrounding community. Depending on whether the right resources exist in the
neighborhood and on the dynamics of the drug market, mangers should either focus their
efforts inward or outward.
Linking the Central Office with Developments
Finally, the BHA needs to link development-based strategies to drug-related
problems with a larger central-office strategy. The central office has tried to create a
structure for this to occur through monthly public safety cluster meetings. The manager,
police officer, and youth workers assigned as cluster representatives meet with the central
office staff to discuss progress in implementing community policing. It is important to
use these meetings as a way of adjusting central office strategies to meet development
needs.
What is missing is a way to link the development and central office on a day-to-
day basis. The coordinator of public safety and community initiatives could serve as this
link. The coordinator would help relay information about public safety needs from the
development to the directors of CID and public safety and help the two departments
devise balanced responses according to the changing dynamics in each development. The
purpose would be to employ the coordinator as a facilitator, not to add an additional
bureaucratic layer between the development and central office levels.
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STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR THREE CASE STUDIES
Were this system to be in place at the central office, here is what might be done to
alleviate the drug situation at the development level in the three cases under study. The
challenge in all three places is to coordinate a set interventions tailored to the unique
circumstances in each place to reverse negative dynamics and set in motion a series of
positive reactions. This will require that the BHA implement different types and degrees
of measures in each development.
South Street
There are few if any proactive efforts to sustain the drug-fighting efforts in and
around South Street. The BHA appears to view the situation there in static fashion -- its
drug problems are minor in comparison with other developments, and South Street has a
youth center, which is a significant resource given its small size. There is little effort to
understand how factors affecting drugs interact and whether the positive dynamic
between development and neighborhood could be sustained or enhanced. With minimal
investment, the BHA could implement preventative measures to solidify currently
effective but precarious drug-fighting efforts in and around the development. Four
strategic implications arise from the South Street case.
First, a marginal investment in building the capacity of the South Street tenant
task force could go a long way. Were there an involved group of tenants inside the
development, neighborhood activists could solidify neighborhood responses to drug
dealing in and around the development and expand the scope of their advocacy efforts on
behalf of development tenants. Moreover, neighborhood activists could teach an
involved group of development tenants how to get attention from the city when they need
it. Activists have made strong efforts on this front, but they have achieved little success
because tenant participation has been ephemeral. Consequently, the rare industry and
resourcefulness of neighborhood residents are being squandered.
CID needs to make building the capacity of the South Street Tenants Task Force a
priority, particularly in light of the resident apathy demonstrated in recent task force
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elections. The manager of the development also is in a good position to support resident
building efforts as shown through his successful track record at previous developments.
Second, the neighborhood could decrease its dependence on individual efforts and
help insure the sustainability of its achievements were it to institutionalize a
neighborhood structure. This would require a paid community organizer position,
however, and currently such funds are scarce. Because the environment around South
Street is activist and contacts to municipal and state levels are established, a community
organizer most likely would be well received and positively impact drug-related
problems. Again, it is important to emphasize how critical it is for the development
manager to be outward looking to take full advantage of the plentiful drug-fighting
resources outside the development.
Third, limited involvement of merchants along South Street constitutes another
weakness in the neighborhood drug-fighting strategy that drug dealers have begun to
exploit. South Street management and neighborhood activists need to organize and
engage this group in order to address the drug market forming around these businesses.
Finally, the BHA central office could recognize and support the sparse organizing
efforts from within the development, principally the South Street Survivors. This group
plays an important drug-prevention role among teenagers in the development. Currently,
this group has no space to operate and could benefit from use of a vacant apartment or
other resources such as old BHA computers.'58
In short, the BHA would have to make only a limited investment to solidify an
effective development/neighborhood drug fighting strategy in and around South Street.
Charlestown
Although the Bunker Hill development faces formidable obstacles in all four
elements important to addressing drugs, there are ways of reorganizing energy that could
help reverse the negative dynamic among these elements. The BHA would have to exert
a large amount of energy and resources to begin to address these drug problems, however.
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158 Swan.
Since neighborhood resources are limited and the drug dealing monopoly has
concentrated dealing in the development and along its borders, a development-based
approach to the drug problems could prove effective. Because rival gangs are not
scattered around the surrounding neighborhood, the BHA has the opportunity to impact
drugs in and around the development in a way that it does not in Bromley Heath.' 59 Here
is one set of interventions the BHA may want to consider.
First, a core group of white males between the ages of 24 and 40 appear to
conduct a substantial part of the drug dealing in the development. Since many of these
individuals live in the development or have family there, the BHA could make a
concerted effort to convict these individuals and other known dealers and evict their
families from the development. Such a strategy first would require that the central office
address bureaucratic obstacles to evictions, such as backlogged grievances. Second, the
police could conduct another drug sweep to remove this population from the
development.
Removing this core group within the development may help tenants feel more
comfortable communicating with police officers. Unfortunately, the upper echelons of
the monopoly still would exert influence on the development. The only way to forge
communication between police and residents may be a concerted effort to break up the
monopolistic drug structure, but such an initiative would have to come from higher police
agencies. The BHA has an officer assigned to the Drug Enforcement Agency and should
use this person as a point from which to coordinate, to the extent possible, efforts to
dismantle the upper echelons and those initiatives to clear out development-level dealing.
The hierarchical structure in Charlestown seems to be showing signs of
vulnerability, however. Police may want to continue chipping away at the hierarchical
structure by widening these openings, but the consequences should be well understood.
The power vacuum after breaking-up the drug monopoly would most likely increase
bloodshed as individuals reshuffle to establish new turf lines and mark the end of the days
of silence but security.
159 For the sake of comparison, I assume that the BHA manages Bromley Heath.
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If undercover drug investigations and a sweep were to knock out this core group
of dealers for a period, a sustained police presence at the development would be
necessary for two reasons. First, police would need to insure that drug dealers stay out of
the development while awaiting sentencing.'60 Second, police would have to be
aggressive about insuring that new dealers, either from the development or outside, not
spring up to fill the vacuum. An incipient group of Dominican drug dealers in the
development make this task critical.
Sustained police presence in the development also could disperse drug dealing
into the surrounding neighborhood and force the upper-income residents to become
involved in safety efforts. Drug dealing in the upper-income area most likely would draw
immediate attention from the City of Boston. Displacement of Bunker Hill dealing into
upper-income areas only would occur if Charles Newtown and Mishawam coordinated to
block relocation of dealing into their areas. Displacing crime from the development up
along Bunker Hill Street and Main Street could force withdrawn merchants to start to
address drug issues of the development, as well. Bunker Hill management could invite
neighbors concerned about displacement to partake in development public safety
meetings. This strategy has proven effective under similar circumstances in the
Washington Beech development.
The BHA would need to coordinate increased police presence with aggressive
youth outreach to prevent the younger population from filling the dealing vacuum.
Almost a quarter of Bunker Hill development residents are between the ages of 5-13, and
efforts to target this population could pay large future dividends. To pursue this goal, the
BHA could rely on resources for youth in the surrounding neighborhood -- the
Charlestown Community Center, St. Catherine's, and the Boys and Girls Club.
Moreover, Father Coyne's rapport with minorities from the development could provide
an important resource for outreach to minority youth and their parents. Management of
the Bunker Hill development would need to link the police and neighborhood institutions
in order to get the timing of hardware and software interventions right.
160 According to the officer who took me on the ride-along, two of the dealers we met in the development
were trying to sell as much as possible before entering prison to serve their time.
113
Management also needs to address problems within the Bunker Hill Tenant Task
Force to insure that the greater resident population is represented and residents feel
comfortable sharing information without fear of reprisal. This would mean changing the
current composition of the task force. More representation of minorities on the task force
may help break the current isolation among minority residents in the development and
encourage them to participate in drug-fighting strategies.
The BHA could make efforts to support the few positive trends currently
occurring around the development. Management and the high school administrator must
coordinate a workable plan to deal with the high school issue.
Given the magnitude of drug-related problems in and around Charlestown,
however, significant interventions will need to come from outside the BHA. These major
external interventions will need to be coordinated in a tight fashion if they are to reverse
to deeply entrenched negative synergies in and around the development.
Bromley Heath
The free market drug situation in and around Bromley Heath necessitates a
planned and coordinated approach between development and neighborhood. The
dynamics among the four variables that affect drug dealing in and around Bromley Heath
suggest that the TMC should reorient the direction of their organizing energy outward.
The inward focus of the TMC and the Bromley Heath police fails to take advantage of
important institutional resources that have developed in the surrounding neighborhood.
The TMC inward focus was appropriate when individuals and institutions in the
surrounding neighborhood were either underdeveloped or had shunned the development.
Now, however, the energy and capacity of institutions in the surrounding neighborhood
offer the TMC the opportunity to work cooperatively to impact drugs in the larger
neighborhood.
Although the BHA does not manage Bromley Heath, it can apply lessons learned
there to developments with similar circumstances. In developments located in a complex
gang network, the most critical component to an effective drug-fighting strategy is an
outward-looking manager who can network with neighborhood institutions and other
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subsidized developments in the area. An outward- looking manager is particularly
important when capable individuals and institutions exist in the surrounding
neighborhood. If the institutional landscape of the surrounding neighborhood is barren
and the area is at a crossroads of many gangs, the manager may want to opt for a
defensible space approach. There are few if any instances when an defensible space
approach would be appropriate for Boston public housing developments, however,
because most are located in neighborhoods with some viable organizations.
Conclusion
The BHA will need to make difficult choices about which of these cases to tackle
first. It is more convenient and less costly to address problems in South Street and
Bromley Heath than in Charlestown. The BHA should take advantage of the
opportunities in the neighborhoods surrounding South Street and Bromley Heath while
they exist. Failure of the BHA to support these efforts potentially could destroy the
positive dynamics and opportunities in these neighborhoods.161 The BHA, therefore,
most probably should tackle these two developments first.
In regards to the Charlestown development, the BHA needs to make sure that
when it takes on the problem, it does so in a relentless and focused way. A one-time
intervention will simply squander money and resources for short-lived improvements.
The BHA, however, should not let the situation continue much longer in Charlestown,
because the problem will be more entrenched and difficult for the BHA to address later,
not to mention the moral imperatives.
161 For the purposes of comparison, I am assuming that the BHA is managing Bromley Heath.
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